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 EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UNIVERSITY INVENTORS IN  
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ABSTRACT 
Studies of the costs and benefits of university patent ownership have, 
to date, focused on life sciences technology.  Increasingly, however, many 
of the most lucrative university-owned patents relate to computing and 
telecommunications, not genes or pharmaceuticals.  In 2007, a University 
of California spin-off named Eolas settled a patent suit with Microsoft for 
$100 million.  In 2010, Cornell University won a $184 million jury verdict 
against Hewlett-Packard in a case that later settled on confidential terms.  
And most recently, in 2014, Carnegie Mellon University received a $1.5 
billion judgment—one of the largest patent damages awards in history—in 
an ongoing suit against Marvell Semiconductors.   
As universities shift their focus in the patent arena, so too must those 
studying tech transfer.  Commentators generally agree that the costs and 
benefits of the patent system vary greatly across industries and many place 
the high-tech and bio-tech industries at opposite ends of that spectrum.  
Accordingly, universities would be well advised to reassess the costs and 
benefits of their own tech transfer programs as they allocate more 
resources to high-tech patenting.   
This Article examines the pros and cons of university patenting in 
high-tech fields by reporting the findings of a survey of professors at major 
U.S. universities who teach and research in the areas of computer science 
and electrical engineering.  Among other findings, survey responses suggest 
that:  
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• Patenting high-tech inventions made on university campuses 
may not be a profitable undertaking, even at those 
universities best-positioned to profit from tech transfer.  
Based on the patenting and licensing activities of survey 
respondents, I estimate that university patent programs 
collectively earn a negative rate of return—an overall loss of 
more than three percent—on funds invested in high-tech 
patenting. 
 
• The prospect of obtaining patent rights to the fruits of their 
research does not appear to motivate university researchers 
in high-tech fields to conduct more or better research.  
Eighty-five percent of professors report that patent rights are 
not among the top four factors motivating their research 
activities.  Moreover, fifty-seven percent of professors report 
that they do not know how, or if at all, their university shares 
licensing revenue with inventors. 
 
• University patent programs may, instead, actually reduce the 
quantity and quality of university research in high-tech fields 
by harming professors’ ability to obtain research funding, to 
collaborate with faculty from other institutions, and to 
disseminate their work to colleagues. 
 
• University patent programs seem to be, at best, a modest 
benefit to professors seeking to commercialize high-tech 
academic research.  Entrepreneurial professors report that 
these programs hinder their ability to work as consultants 
with companies that show interest in their research, and 
fewer than half of university spin-off founders report that the 
ability to patent their research affirmatively helped their 
commercialization efforts. 
 
 
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285 (2014)  2013-2014  
287 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 287!
I.! SURVEY METHODOLOGY, POPULATION, AND SAMPLE.......................... 295!
A.! Target Population .......................................................................... 296!
B.! Survey Respondents........................................................................ 298!
II.! THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF UNIVERSITY HIGH-TECH PATENTS ........ 301!
A.! Direct Costs and Revenues to Universities .................................... 301!
B.! Indirect Costs and Benefits to Society............................................ 313!
1.! Do University High-Tech Patents Encourage  
Academic Research? ................................................................ 314!
2.! Do University High-Tech Patents Hinder  
Academic Research? ................................................................ 320!
3.! Consulting and Commercialization Opportunities .................. 324!
4.! Net Effect.................................................................................. 328!
III.!WHY DO UNIVERSITIES AND FACULTY MEMBERS PATENT?................. 329!
A. Why Do Universities Patent Research?........................................... 329!
B. Why Do Faculty Members Patent Research?.................................. 330!
CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 333!
APPENDIX A: FULL TEXT OF SURVEY QUESTIONS ...................................... 335!
APPENDIX B: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF COST MODEL............................. 341!
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the three decades since the Bayh-Dole Act first allowed 
universities to freely patent most academic research,1 inventions in the life 
                                                
1 The Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2006)), allowed universities to automatically take ownership of 
patentable inventions discovered in the course of federally-funded academic research.  
Overall, about two-thirds of university research funding comes from the federal 
government.  See University Research: The Role of Federal Funding, ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS. 
(Jan. 2011), http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=11588 (“[T]he federal 
government supports about 60% of the research performed at universities. In 2009, that 
amounted to the federal government supporting about $33 billion of universities’ total 
annual R&D spending of $55 billion.”).  Prior to the Act’s passage, U.S. universities 
received just dozens of patents annually; today they receive several thousand. See Peter 
Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 35 (2013) (“In 1965, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) granted 96 patents to 28 U.S. universities or related 
institutions.  In 1992, a little over a decade after the Act, the USPTO granted almost 1,500 
patents to over 150 U.S. universities or related institutions. By 2002, academic institutions 
were receiving more than 3,000 patents per year.” (footnotes omitted)). But see David C. 
Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patent Quality and Quantity Before and After 
the Bayh–Dole Act in the United States, 31 RES. POL’Y 399 (2002) (concluding from a 
study of patents owned by the University of California system, Stanford, and Columbia that 
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sciences have dominated headlines and bottom-lines in the world of 
university technology transfer.  Recombinant DNA,2 stem cells,3 genes,4 
                                                                                                                       
this growth in patenting was primarily due to the concurrent “rise of biomedical research 
and inventive activity,” not the Bayh-Dole Act). 
2 Stanford University and the University of California system, which jointly licensed the 
technology through Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing, earned approximately 
$255 million in royalties for recombinant DNA, or “gene splicing,” technology before their 
patent rights expired in 1997.  See LOUIS G. TORNATZKY ET AL., INNOVATION U: NEW 
UNIVERSITY ROLES IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 161-62 (2002). 
3 The University of Wisconsin—through its patent-holding counterpart, the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation (WARF)—has licensed patents covering fundamental stem 
cell technology for more than a decade.  See Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work 
of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem 
Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157 (2002); see also Terri Somers, Foundation’s Stem 
Cell Patents Impede Research, Scientists Say, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 30, 2006, 
http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/science/20060730-9999-1n30stems.html (“Under the 
patents, a researcher in the United States who uses embryonic stem cells in any way must 
pay a licensing fee to WARF . . . as high as $250,000 . . . [and] annual maintenance fees of 
about $40,000.”); Kathleen Gallagher, Geron to Begin Clinical Trials for Stem Cell 
Therapy, MILWAUKEE-WISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL, Jan. 23, 2009 (reporting that 
“WARF has 30 commercial embryonic stem cell licensees, and many more in discussion” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Many believe that WARF’s licensing efforts have 
impeded, rather than spurred, stem cell research in the United States.  See, e.g., Sandy 
Kleffman, Stem Cell Research’s Newest Foe: Patents, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 19, 
2006, at F4 (“[WARF’s] patents are impeding our research . . . . [and] making scientists go 
overseas to do this sort of research.” (quoting Jeanne Loring, Director, Stem Cell Research 
Center, Burnham Institute for Medical Research)).  WARF’s patent rights were challenged 
at the Patent and Trademark Office with some success by Consumer Watchdog and the 
Public Patent Foundation (PubPat).  See Susan Decker, Gene Patent Case Fuels U.S. Court 
Test of Stem Cell Right, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 5, 2014, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-06/gene-patent-case-fuels-u-s-court-test-of-
stem-cell-right.html.  
4 Though many universities own gene patents, none has garnered more publicity than the 
University of Utah, which received patent rights to two genes linked to hereditary breast 
cancer and transferred those rights to a spin-off named Myriad Genetics.  See generally E. 
Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 
GENETICS IN MED. S39 (Supp. 2010).  As WARF did with its rights to stem cell lines, 
Myriad sought licensing fees from researchers and medical providers in a manner that 
many deemed ethically questionable.  See Mildred K. Cho et al., Special Article, Effects of 
Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. 
MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 6 (2003) (finding that 9 of 122 surveyed U.S. laboratories 
stopped conducting genetic tests for the BRCA genes due to fear of infringement litigation 
with Myriad); see also Gold & Carbone, supra, at S44 (collecting similar studies). 
Myriad’s patent rights were largely invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2013 in a case 
brought by public interest groups, including the ACLU and PubPat.  Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).  
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and popular pharmaceuticals like Lyrica5 and Emtriva6 have driven 
university licensing revenue and, consequently, have been the primary focus 
of scholars studying invention on college campuses.7 
However, things are changing in the world of university patenting.  
In recent years, tech transfer tectonics have shifted strongly in the direction 
of computing and telecommunications.  Increasingly, universities are 
pursuing patents on high-tech8 inventions9 and, moreover, enforcing those 
                                                
5 In 2007, Northwestern University sold a portion of its right to Lyrica, a pharmaceutical 
used to treat nerve pain, for $700 million.  See Irene Abrams et al., How Are U.S. 
Technology Transfer Offices Tasked and Motivated—Is It All About the Money?, 17 RES. 
MGMT. REV. 1, 3 (2009). 
6 In 2005, Emory University sold the rights to Emtriva, a pharmaceutical used to treat HIV, 
to Gilead Pharmaceuticals for $525 million.  Id. 
7 See, e.g., Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price, Patent Trolling—Why Bio & 
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk (U.C. Hastings Research Paper Series, Paper No. 93, 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2395987 (searching the 
patent portfolios of five major universities for patents covering biotech inventions that 
could be widely asserted); David E. Winickoff, Private Assets, Public Mission: The 
Politics of Technology Transfer and the New American University, 54 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 1 
(2013) (“Technology transfer has become a site through which law, life sciences, and the 
idea of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ are coevolving.”); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating 
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 77, 77 (1999) (“Among legal scholars, a debate is currently raging about the proper 
scope of intellectual property rights in non-commercial—or ‘basic’—scientific research.  
The debate focuses on basic research in molecular biology, the foundational science of the 
large and dynamic biotechnology industry.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights 
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (analyzing 
intellectual property rights in basic research through the lens of norms among biotech 
researchers). 
8 In this Article, I use “high-tech” generally to refer to all technology pertaining to 
computers, electronics, and telecommunications.  Cf. Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of 
Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls without 
Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1329 (2013) (“I label ‘high tech’ all 
patents covering computer, electronics, and/or telecommunications technology, including 
all software patents.”). 
9 See Arti K. Rai et al., University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First 
Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1534-35 (2009) (finding in an empirical study of 
university patents that “university software patenting increased more than ten-fold over the 
1982-2002 period” and also that the share of all university patents covering software rose 
from 9% in 1982 to 13% in 2002).  Today, high-tech patents constitute a third or more of 
some universities’ portfolios.  For example, patents covering “software and computing” 
inventions have comprised about 30% of the University of Illinois’s patent portfolio since 
2006.  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Office of Technology Management 
Annual Report Fiscal Year 2006, at 4 (2006), available at 
http://otm.illinois.edu/sites/all/files/files/2006-otm-annual-report.pdf.  Likewise, at 
Carnegie Mellon, faculty from the electrical engineering and computer science departments 
file over 40% of all invention disclosures.  Carnegie Mellon University, Center for 
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rights widely and aggressively.10  Though virtually unheard of when Eolas, 
a University of California spin-off, sued Microsoft in 1999, high-tech patent 
suits initiated by universities and their partners have become commonplace 
in the fifteen years since.11  Following in Eolas’s footsteps, Cornell 
University sued Hewlett-Packard in 2001.12  The University of Wisconsin 
sued Creative Technology in 2002, Sony and Toshiba in 2003, and six more 
high-tech companies over the next five years.13  The University of Texas 
accused fifty-five high-tech companies of infringement in three cases filed 
in 2005.14  A Yale University spin-off named Mirror Worlds sued Apple in 
2008, winning a $625 million jury verdict that was later overturned.15 The 
                                                                                                                       
Technology Transfer and Enterprise Creation, From Research to Real Life, at 5 (2007) 
available at http://www.cmu.edu/cttec/documents/cttec-annual-report-06-07.pdf (showing 
that in 2007 computer science faculty filed about 33%, and electrical engineering faculty 
about 13.5%, of all invention disclosures). 
10 See Jacob H. Rooksby, Sue U., ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2012, 
http://www.aaup.org/article/sue-u#.UvAP2vldW6I (identifying “more than sixty 
universities’ participation in more than 280 patent-infringement lawsuits since 1973 (the 
first year for which moderately reliable records exist), with substantial growth since the 
year 2000”).  For greater detail on university administrators’ thoughts on filing patent suits, 
see Jacob H. Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of University Patent 
Enforcement, 46 AKRON L. REV. 171 (2013). 
11 See, e.g., Joe Mullin, The Web’s Longest Nightmare Ends: Eolas’ Patents Are Dead on 
Appeal, ARS TECHNICA, July 22, 2013, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/the-
webs-longest-nightmare-ends-eolas-patents-are-dead-on-appeal/ (reporting that Eolas’ suit 
against Microsoft settled for more than $100 million and netted the University of California 
approximately $30 million).  Eolas went on to sue two dozen more companies in 2009 after 
settling with Microsoft.  Id. 
12 See, e.g., Susan Kelley, Hewlett-Packard, Cornell Reach Settlement in Patent Case, 
CORNELL CHRON., June 9, 2010, http://www.news.cornell.edu/ stories/2010/06/hewlett-
packard-cornell-reach-settlement-patent-case (reporting that the case resulted in a jury 
award of $184 million that was subsequently reduced by the judge post-trial to $71.3 
million, before the case settled on confidential terms). 
13 WARF v. Intel Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 898 (W.D. Wis. 2009); WARF v. Adv. Micro 
Dev., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-00726 (W.D. Wis. filed Dec. 12, 2006); WARF v. Cypress 
Semiconductor Corp., No. 3:05-cv-00336 (W.D. Wis. filed June 7, 2005); WARF v. Int’l 
Bus. Mach. Corp., No. 3:04-cv-00867 (W.D. Wis. filed Nov. 17, 2004); WARF v. Infineon 
Tech. AG, No. 3:04-cv-00394 (W.D. Wis. filed June 21, 2004); WARF v. Sony Corp., No. 
3:03-cv-00595 (W.D. Wis. filed Oct. 20, 2003); WARF v. Creative Tech. Ltd., No. 3:02-
cv-00570 (W.D. Wis. filed Oct. 15, 2002). 
14 Bd. Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Mitsubishi Elec., No. 1:05-cv-00333 (W.D. Tex. filed 
May 6, 2005); Bd. Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Alcatel, No. 1:05-cv-00198 (W.D. Tex. 
filed Mar. 22, 2005); Bd. Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. BenQ Am. Corp., No. 1:05-cv-
00181 (W.D. Tex. filed Mar. 11, 2005). 
15 See Susan Decker, Apple Win in Mirror Worlds Case Left Intact by High Court, 
BLOOMBERG, June 24, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-24/apple-win-in-
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University of Washington sued thirty high-tech companies between 2010 
and 2012, including Garmin, Logitech, Sandisk, and Sharp.16   And, in what 
may prove to be a watershed moment for university patent enforcement, 
Carnegie Mellon University won a $1.17 billion verdict against Marvell 
Semiconductor in 2012, a verdict that was enhanced by thirty-one percent 
before Marvell appealed the case in 2014.17 
Inspired by the (at least temporary) successes of patentees like 
Mirror Worlds and Carnegie Mellon,18 universities filed more high-tech 
patent suits in 2013 than any year to date.19  Boston University alone filed 
                                                                                                                       
mirror-worlds-case-left-intact-by-high-court.html (reporting that the case resulted in an 
approximately $625 million jury verdict that was overturned after the trial). 
16 See, e.g., Wash. Research Found. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02092 (W.D. Wash. filed 
Nov. 30, 2012); Wash. Research Found. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 2:11-cv-02079 (W.D. 
Wash. filed Dec. 12, 2011); Wash. Research Found. v. Sharp Corp., No. 2:11-cv-02080 
(W.D. Wash. filed Dec. 12, 2011); Wash. Research Found. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile 
Comm. AB, No. 2:11-cv-00651 (W.D. Wash. filed Apr. 15, 2011); Wash. Research Found. 
v. Silicon Labs., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-01050 (W.D. Wash. filed June 24, 2010).  Washington 
also sued several more high-tech companies in 2006.  See, e.g., Wash. Research Found. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., No. 2:06-cv-01813 (W.D. Wash. filed Dec. 21, 2006).  To be 
clear, this list includes just a fraction of the high-tech patent suits filed by universities 
during the last decade.  Other notable examples include the University of Illinois’s 2011 
suit, Micron. Bd. Trustees, Univ. Ill. v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-02288 (C.D. Ill. 
filed Dec. 5, 2011), which is discussed infra. 
17 See Jonathan Stempel, Marvell Patent Verdict Grows to $1.54 Billion, REUTERS, Apr. 1, 
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/marvell-carnegiemellon-lawsuit-
idUSL4N0MT37L20140401 (noting that “the award is 31 percent more than the $1.17 
billion previously awarded by a jury”). 
18 Historically, large damages awards in patent cases have, more often than not, been 
reversed or reduced after trial or on appeal.  See 2012 Patent Litigation Study, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2013/03/2012-
patent-litigation-study.pdf (finding that, of the ten largest patent verdicts between 1995 and 
2011, “most . . . have since been vacated, remanded, or reduced, while some remain in the 
appellate process”).  A group of fifteen law professors, including the author, filed an 
amicus brief in support of Marvell’s appeal arguing that the jury verdict improperly 
awarded damages for extraterritorial conduct that, by law, cannot constitute U.S. patent 
infringement.  Brief Amici Curiae of Fifteen Professors of Intellectual Property Law in 
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 14-1492 (Fed. Cir.), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2479090. 
19 Universities filed ninety-five total patent suits in 2013, up from sixty in 2012, forty-two 
in 2011, and twenty-four in 2010.  See LEX MACHINA, http://www.lexmachina.com 
(searching for all patent suits involving a party with “university,” “college,” or “research 
foundation” in its name, and removing false positives).  Boston University was responsible 
for thirty-nine of those ninety-five.  Id.  This tally excludes cases filed by parties that 
exclusively licensed or purchased university patents and, thus, understates the total number 
of suits enforcing university-originated patents.  
 DO UNIVERSITY PATENTS PAY OFF? 
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thirty-nine suits against more than twice as many companies.20  In fact, 
universities have proven so litigious in the high-tech sector in recent months 
that they have increasingly been hit with the “patent troll” moniker,21 a 
designation that they have long been spared.22   
Despite the negative attention recent suits have brought, there is 
good reason to believe that aggressive university patent assertion is here to 
stay.  Nationwide, university administrators face mounting pressure to find 
new sources of revenue,23 and patent assertion on the whole has never been 
more popular.24  Moreover, university groups have recently voiced strong 
                                                
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Daniel Engber, In Pursuit of Knowledge and Profit: How Universities Aid and 
Abet Patent Trolls, SLATE, May, 8, 2014, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/history_of_innovation/2014/05/patent_trolls_uni
versities_sometimes_look_a_lot_like_trolls.html; John Koetsier, Congratulations, Boston 
University, You’re Now a Patent Troll, VENTUREBEAT (July 3, 2013, 12:17pm EDT), 
http://venturebeat.com/2013/07/03/congratulations-boston-university-youre-now-a-patent-
troll/; Timothy B. Lee, Patent Trolls Have a Surprising Ally: Universities, WASH. POST: 
THE SWITCH (Nov. 30, 2013, 11:05am EDT), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/11/30/patent-trolls-have-a-surprising-ally-universities/ (“When it’s pointed 
out that this definition of a patent troll also applies to some universities, patent reformers 
are usually quick to clarify that they don’t regard universities as patent trolls. But the 
reality is that some universities do, in fact, behave like patent trolls.”). 
22 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (“Universities are non-practicing entities. They share 
some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly defined, but they are not 
trolls.”); Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Judicial 
Conference on the State of Patent Litigation (Sep. 27, 2011) (“[T]he NPE designation 
sweeps in some unintended ‘culprits’ like universities . . . .”).  For a discussion of 
university administrators’ fears of being labeled “trolls,” see Rooksby, When Tigers Bare 
Teeth, supra note 10, at 191-94. 
23 See, e.g., More US Colleges Face Stagnating Enrollment and Tuition Revenue, 
According to Moody’s Survey, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV. 1 (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://www.marquette.edu/budget/documents/MoreUSCollegesFace 
StagnatingEnrollmentandTuitionRevenueAccordingtoMoodysSurvey11013.pdf (finding in 
a survey of U.S. universities that nearly 50% are facing declining enrollment and about 
40% expect tuition revenue to decline or grow by less than 2% in 2013). 
24 The percentage of patent suits filed by patentees that, like universities, do not sell tech 
products—often referred to as non-practicing entities (NPEs)—has been on the rise since at 
least 2000.  See Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 365 (2012) 
(finding, in a study of 100 patent suits filed each year from 2007 to 2011, that the 
percentage attributable to NPEs was roughly 22% in 2007, 27% in 2008, 33% in 2009, 
30% in 2010, and 40% in 2011); Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects 
of Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2013) (expanding Jeruss et 
al.’s study to find that NPEs filed roughly 59% of patent suits in 2012); Colleen V. Chien, 
Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-
Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1604 (2009) (finding, in a study of 2,300 high-tech 
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opposition to “troll fighting” patent reform bills presently pending in 
Congress, a likely signal that universities anticipate enforcing high-tech 
patents more often in the future.25 
As universities shift their focus in the patent arena, so too must those 
studying tech transfer.  Commentators generally agree that the costs and 
benefits of the patent system vary greatly across industries,26 and many 
place high-tech and bio-tech at opposite ends of that spectrum.27  Drastic 
differences between these two industries in terms of patent density,28 non-
                                                                                                                       
patent suits filed between 2000 and 2008, that NPEs filed 10% of all suits initiated between 
2000-2001, 16% between 2002-2003, 16% between 2004-2005, and 20% between 2006-
2008). 
25 See Lee, supra note 21 (noting that several university groups have publicly expressed 
opposition to a patent reform bill “target[ing] patent trolls” that passed in the House in 
2013). 
26 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 880 (1990) (modeling the impact of patents in industries with a 
variety of characteristics, including “discrete,” “cumulative,” “chemical,” and “science-
based” industries); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1575, 1615-30 (2003) (matching industries with five economic theories of patent 
protection: prospect theory, competitive innovation, cumulative innovation, anticommons 
theory, and patent thickets). 
27 See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: 
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 
177-78 (2004) (finding “significant interindustry differences in the importance of patents as 
vehicles for knowledge transfer . . . between universities and industry” and “that university 
patenting and licensing were more important for the biomedical inventions than for the one 
electronics invention we studied”); Rai et al., supra note 9, at 1550 (“As the data on the 
varying importance of patents as incentives in different industries suggests, . . . the optimal 
mode of university-industry technology transfer is likely to vary by industry and invention  
. . . . [and] the theory espoused in the legislative history of Bayh-Dole . . . does not apply 
neatly in the software context, where development costs are often low relative to other 
types of inventions.”); see also Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict 
Competition and Creativity Excessively?, BECKER-POSNER Blog (Sept. 30, 2012, 
10:30pm), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-
restrict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html (“The pharmaceutical and 
software industries are the extremes so far as the social benefits and costs of patent 
protection are concerned . . . .”); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in 
Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1992-93 (2009) (“[T]he pharmaceutical industry and 
the software industry . . . have generally proven to be . . . balanced on opposite sides of 
many key issues in patent law and policy.”). 
28 Compare Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug? 
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 299, 316-17 (2010) (reporting that pharmaceuticals are typically protected 
by just two to four patents per drug), with Brian J. Love, Apple Bites Back: But Will the 
Company Come to Regret its Huge Court Victory?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012, at A15 
(“The average smartphone may arguably infringe as many as 250,000 patents, not to 
mention myriad copyrights and other design-related intellectual property.”). 
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patent incentives for invention,29 the overall speed of innovation,30 and the 
prevalence of innocent infringement,31 all suggest that patent rights impose 
different costs of different magnitudes and generate different benefits of 
different magnitudes in each field.  Accordingly, they also suggest that 
universities would be well advised to reassess the costs and benefits of their 
own tech transfer programs as they allocate more resources to high-tech 
patenting.   
This Article aims to assist in this reassessment by presenting the 
results of a survey of university researchers in high-tech fields.  Part I of the 
Article details the survey itself, including the target population, sample, and 
survey logistics.  Part II presents survey data on the direct fiscal costs and 
benefits of university patenting in high-tech fields and uses this data to 
estimate the rate of return universities earn from their high-tech patent 
programs.  Part III expands this initial analysis by presenting additional 
survey data on the broader indirect costs and benefits university patenting 
may have for society as a whole.  Parts II & III conclude that patenting 
high-tech university research may fail a cost-benefit analysis.  Specifically, 
survey responses suggest that: 
 
• Patenting high-tech inventions made on university campuses 
may not be a profitable undertaking, even at those 
universities best-positioned to profit from tech transfer.  
Based on the patenting and licensing activities of survey 
respondents, I estimate that university patent programs 
collectively earn a negative rate of return—an overall loss of 
                                                
29 See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1262, 
1290 (2009) (finding in a survey of start-up companies that (i) first mover advantage, not 
patent protection, was the most “important” means to “capture competitive advantage” in 
the software industry, and (ii) that the majority of start-up companies in the software 
industry hold no patents at all).  Consider also that the software industry flourished in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s despite the fact that software was not clearly patentable until 
later in the decade.  See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 26, at 1618-19. 
30 In the computer industry, products become twice as powerful roughly every two years.  
This observation, which has held true for decades, is known as “Moore’s law.” See Gordon 
E. Moore, Progress in Digital Integrated Electronics, Int’l Electron Devices Meeting, 
IEEE (1975), reprinted in SSCS: IEEE SOLID-STATE CIRCUITS SOC’Y NEWS, Sept. 2006, at 
36, 37 (predicting that computing power will double approximately every two years). 
31 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1421, 1445 (2009) (finding that, overall, allegations of copying are made in about 
11% of patent suits—the majority of which involve pharmaceutical or chemical patents—
while copying is alleged in just 3% of high-tech cases). 
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more than three percent—on funds invested in high-tech 
patenting. 
 
• The prospect of obtaining patent rights to the fruits of their 
research does not appear to motivate university researchers 
in high-tech fields to conduct more or better research.  
Eighty-five percent of professors report that patent rights are 
not among the top four factors motivating their research 
activities.  Moreover, fifty-seven percent of professors report 
that they do not know how, or if at all, their university shares 
licensing revenue with inventors. 
 
• University patent programs may, instead, actually reduce the 
quantity and quality of university research in high-tech fields 
by harming professors’ ability to obtain research funding, to 
collaborate with faculty from other institutions, and to 
disseminate their work to colleagues. 
 
• University patent programs seem to be, at best, a modest 
benefit to professors seeking to commercialize high-tech 
academic research.  Entrepreneurial professors report that 
these programs hinder their ability to work as consultants 
with companies that show interest in their research, and 
fewer than half of university spin-off founders report that the 
ability to patent their research affirmatively helped their 
commercialization efforts.  
 
Finally, given the above findings, Part IV takes a closer look at 
survey responses—particularly narrative comments—that shed light on why 
universities and professors choose to patent research, even when doing so 
appears to not always be in their own best interest.     
I. SURVEY METHODOLOGY, POPULATION, AND SAMPLE 
To study the costs and benefits of patenting academic research 
related to computing and telecommunications, I surveyed electrical and 
computer engineering (ECE) and computer science (CS) professors at top 
U.S. research universities to collect data on their experiences with 
university patenting and licensing programs.  In this Part, I describe my 
survey population and the sample of professors who responded. 
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A. Target Population 
For this survey, I chose a target population of all 2,387 tenured and 
tenure-track faculty members32 affiliated with the nation’s top twenty ECE 
and CS departments, shown below in Table 1, as ranked by U.S. News and 
World Report in 2013.   
Generally speaking, this population covers the most fertile ground in 
the United States for patentable university research related to computers and 
telecommunications.  On average, these universities attract the best faculty 
members, who in turn benefit from the strongest graduate students, the best 
facilities, and the most lucrative research packages.33  Accordingly, they 
presumably enjoy the circumstances best-suited to produce large-quantity 
and high-quality university invention.34  Statistics bear this out.  Reports of 
aggregate university licensing revenue routinely place these universities 
among the top in the nation.35  They also have among the nation’s most 
experienced36 tech transfer offices and are among the universities that 
produce the most patents37 and academic papers38 in high-tech fields. 
                                                
32 I identified faculty members by visiting each department’s website.  This tally excludes 
“research” faculty, grad students, and post-docs, but does include tenured and tenure-track 
“affiliated” faculty from other departments, as well as emeritus professors who appeared to 
have an office and conduct research. 
33 The methodology U.S. News uses to rank these programs includes an assessment of, 
inter alia, student selectivity, faculty resources, and research activity.  See Sam Flanigan & 
Robert Morse, Methodology: Best Engineering Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/articles/2013/03/11/methodology-best-engineering-schools-rankings. 
34 Dante Di Gregorio & Scott Shane, Why Do Some Universities Generate More Start-ups 
than Others?, 32 RES. POL’Y 209, 222 (2003) (finding that commercialization activities are 
correlated with a university’s “intellectual eminence” and hypothesizing that this is because 
(i) “researchers from more prestigious universities are better researchers and thus are more 
likely to create firms to capture the rents to their rare and valuable intellectual property” 
and (ii) “investors use signals, such as institutional reputation or prestige, to help assess the 
commercial potential of university technologies”). 
35 As shown below in Table 1, these 17 universities and the University of California 
system, which reports aggregate statistics, account for 5 of the top 10, and 11 of the top 35, 
universities ranked by average annual licensing revenue earned between 1991 and 2012.  
See ASSOC. UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, STATISTICS ACCESS FOR TECH TRANSFER (last 
accessed Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.autm.net/source/STATT/index.cfm?section=STATT.  
They also account for 11 of the top 24 universities ranked by the average number of 
licenses executed per year between 1991 and 2012, and 15 of the top 22 universities ranked 
by the average number of spin-offs created each year between 1991 and 2012.   Id. 
36 These 17 universities and the University of California system, which reports aggregate 
statistics, account for 12 of the 35 oldest tech transfer programs in the nation.  See id.  The 
youngest of these 18 tech transfer programs (Georgia Tech’s) was established in 1990.  Id. 
Prior studies have found a correlation between tech transfer office age and profitability.  
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As a result, this population essentially represents a best-case 
scenario for the observation of the fiscal and social benefits of university 
high-tech patenting.  If university tech transfer programs fail to successfully 
carry out their mission at these schools, they very likely also fail to do so at 
lower-ranked schools.39 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
See Ashley Stevens, Do Most Universities Lose Money on Their Technology Transfer 
Activities?, Presentation at Assoc. Univ. Tech. Managers Annual Meeting, at 35 (2005), 
http://sites.kauffman.org/pdf/tt/Stevens_Ashley.pdf (showing that tech transfer offices 
established prior to 1990 are more likely than newer offices to turn a profit today). 
37 As ranked by Rai et al., supra note 9, at 1536, tbl. 1, these universities account for 9 of 
the top 10 “software” patent producing universities. 
38 As ranked by Microsoft Academic Search, these twenty universities account for 18 of the 
top 20 most cited computer science faculties in the U.S. and 15 of the top 20 most cited 
electrical engineering faculties in the nation.  Microsoft Academic Search, Top 
Organizations in Computer Science (last accessed Feb. 1, 2014) 
http://academic.research.microsoft.com/RankList?entitytype=7&topdomainid=2&subdoma
inid=0&last=0&continentid=2&orderby=1; Microsoft Academic Search, Top 
Organizations in Electrical Engineering (last accessed Feb. 1, 2014) 
http://academic.research.microsoft.com/RankList?entitytype=7&topdomainid=8&subdoma
inid=6&last=0&orderby=1&continentid=2.  Prior studies have noted a correlation between 
professors’ publication record and rate of patent disclosures.  See Jerry G. Thursby et al., 
Patterns of Research and Licensing Activity of Science and Engineering Faculty, in 
SCIENCE AND THE UNIVERSITY, at *14 (Paula E. Stephan & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 
2007), 
https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri/conferences/upload/2003may/chericonf2003_07.pdf 
(finding in a survey of engineering and science faculty at 6 major research universities 
between 1983 and 1999 that “[a]s publications increase, the likelihood of [invention] 
disclosure increases”); see also Darren E. Zinner et al., Participation of Academic 
Scientists in Relationships with Industry, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1814, 1818 (2009), available 
at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/6/1814.full.pdf+html (“[F]aculty with industry 
relationships published significantly more and published at greater rate in the last three 
years than respondents without such connections.”). 
39 Prior research demonstrates that a small number of top universities dominate tech 
transfer statistics.  See, e.g., Lita Nelsen, Ten Things Heads of Institutions Should Know 
About Setting Up a Technology Transfer Office, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION 540 (A. Krattiger et al., eds. 
2007) (“[T]en universities in the U.S. (6.3% of the total) account for almost 60% of the 
total royalty income . . . .”); Walter D. Valdivia, University Start-Ups: Critical for 
Improving Technology Transfer, BROOKINGS INST. 6 (Nov. 2013) (“In 2012, a year very 
much in line with the ten-year trends in this sector, the top 5% of earners (8 universities) 
took 50% of the total licensing income of the university system; and the top 10% (16 
universities) took nearly three-quarters of the system’s income.”). 
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Table 1: Target Population 
    US News Rankings: AUTM:40  
University ECE CS Average License Rev. Faculty Size 
M.I.T. 1 1 1 9 155 (ECE & CS) 
Stanford 1 1 1 7 67 (ECE), 54 (CS) 
U.C. Berkeley 3 1 2    241 105 (ECE & CS) 
Univ. of Illinois 3 5 4 33 100(ECE), 61(CS) 
Carnegie Mellon 7 1 4 34 93 (ECE), 111 (CS) 
Cornell 7 5 6 41 49 (ECE), 58 (CS) 
Georgia Tech 5 10 7.5 63 140 (ECE), 36 (CS) 
Cal. Tech. 5 11 8 20 22 (ECE), 25 (CS) 
Princeton 11 8 9.5 16 34 (ECE), 39 (CS) 
Univ. Texas 11 8 9.5 51 80 (ECE), 44 (CS) 
Univ. Michigan 7 13 10 25 77 (ECE & CS) 
Univ. Wisconsin 14 11 12.5 5 62 (ECE), 48 (CS) 
U.C.L.A. 13 14 13.5 2 59 (ECE), 98 (CS) 
U.C. San Diego 14 14 14 2 75 (ECE), 55 (CS) 
Univ. Maryland 14 14 14 68 76 (ECE), 57 (CS) 
Purdue 10 20 15 55 106 (ECE), 57 (CS) 
Univ. Washington 26 7 16.5 10 43 (ECE), 54 (CS) 
Univ. So. Cal. 14 20 17 61 85 (ECE), 34 (CS) 
Columbia 19 17 18 4 33 (ECE), 42 (CS) 
Rice 19 20 19.5 140 25 (ECE), 25 (CS) 
B. Survey Respondents 
I conducted the survey by sending email invitations42 with links to 
an online survey instrument43 that remained active between May 28 and 
                                                
40 Average annual licensing revenue reported to the AUTM between 1991 and 2012.  
ASSOC. UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 35. 
41 The AUTM reports only aggregate data for the UC system as a whole.  Id.  The 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San Diego campuses collectively account for 53.1% of all UC 
system patents active as of 2013.  University of California, Ideas, Inventions, Impact: 
Technology Commercialization Report 22 (2013), available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/innovation-alliances-services/_files/ott/genresources/documents/ 
IASRptFY13.pdf. 
42 I constructed an email database using professors’ contact information as provided on 
their respective departments’ websites.  See, e.g., Faculty & Advisors, MIT EECS (last 
accessed Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.eecs.mit.edu/people/faculty-advisors.  
43 I created the instrument using Google Docs and hosted it via Google Drive using my 
Santa Clara University Google Apps account.  A copy of the survey is reproduced in 
Appendix A, with the exception of two series of (mostly attitudinal) questions that I have 
tentatively reserved for use in future research and do not discuss infra.  
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June 19, 2013.44  During this period, I collected a sample of 269 responses, 
for an overall response rate of 11.3%.45   
Respondents in this sample are highly representative of the target 
population with respect to publicly-observable characteristics.  To measure 
representativeness, I collected demographic information from a random 
selection of 100 professors from my target population for comparison with 
survey respondents.46  As shown below in Table 2, respondents are highly 
representative of the target population with respect to duration of work 
experience, gender, and rate and quantity of patenting and entrepreneurial 
activities. 
 
Table 2: Target Population vs. Respondent Sample 
 
 Population Respondents 
Departmental affiliation: 
     ECE 
     CS 
     Both/Other47 
 
  48.3%48 
37.6% 
14.1% 
 
48.3% 
37.9% 
13.8% 
Mean years’ experience:     
                                                
44 I invited professors in the target population to participate in the survey by email on May 
28, 2013.  I invited professors who had not yet responded a second time on June 10, 2013.  
I received my final survey response on June 18, and closed data collection on June 19, 
2013.  To encourage participation, I stated in both emails that “the first 300 respondents to 
complete the survey will each receive a $5 Amazon.com e-gift card.  Additionally, ALL 
respondents who complete the survey by Wednesday June 19 will be entered in a raffle that 
will award another $500 total in Amazon.com e-gift cards.” 
45 This response rate is typical for an online survey.  See Survey Monkey, Survey Sample 
Size (last accessed Feb. 1, 2014), https://www.surveymonkey.com/mp/sample-size/ (“For 
online surveys in which there is no prior relationship with recipients, a response rate of 
between 20-30% is considered to be highly successful. A response rate of 10-15% is a 
more conservative and a safer guess if you haven’t surveyed your population before.”).  
Some respondents chose not to answer every question and, thus, some of the results 
reported below are drawn from a smaller sample.  I have noted this infra, where applicable. 
46 I collected this information from professors’ publicly available biographies, CVs, and 
social network accounts. 
47 At several universities, both areas are combined into a single department.  See, e.g., 
Electrical Engineering & Computer Science, MIT EECS (last accessed Feb. 1, 2014), 
http://www.eecs.mit.edu/.  Also, a small number of professors hold joint appointments with 
one or both of their respective university’s EE and CS departments and another 
department, such as aerospace engineering, biomedical engineering, communications, 
industrial engineering, information science, materials science, mathematics, music, physics, 
or psychology. 
48 These departmental affiliations were calculated using the entire 2,387 professor 
population, not the 100 professor random sample. 
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     As a professor 20.1 years49 20.7 years50 
     As non-prof academic 
researcher51 
6.1 years 6.1 years 
     In industry52 3.1 years 3.1 years 
Percent named as inventor 
on at least 1 univ. patent53 
 
51.5% 
 
54.3% 
Mean no. of univ. patents 
per named inventor54 
7.2 7.0 
                                                                                                                       
49 For 10 professors in the random target population sample, I was unable to locate 
complete work experience data.  Thus, these averages were calculated from 90, rather than 
100, observations. 
50 For survey questions requesting data on years of work experience, my instructions stated 
that respondents could round to the nearest multiple of five.  See App. A, infra (“For this 
question and the two that follow, feel free to round to the nearest 5-year increment (i.e., 5, 
10, 15, 20) if you cannot recall the number with greater precision.”).  Nonetheless, the vast 
majority of respondents provided data rounded to the nearest year. 
51 This figure includes years spent as a graduate student and any additional time spent in a 
post-doc program, visiting assistant professorship, or other temporary university-affiliated 
research position.  See App. A, infra (“Include, if applicable, years spent in a Masters, PhD, 
or post-doc program working on potentially patentable research”). 
52 In addition to long-term post-graduation work in industry, this figure includes summer 
internships and periods of time working as an industry consultant while employed as a 
professor, the latter discounted by 80% to reflect that university policies generally limit 
consulting to one day per week.  Cf. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLEGES, GUIDELINES FOR 
DEALING WITH FACULTY CONFLICTS OF COMMITMENT AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN 
RESEARCH (Jan. 29, 1998), available at http://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/node/3185 (reporting 
that “most institutions afford their faculty one day per work week for scholarly pursuits that 
relate to and advance professional growth and public service”); David M. Rabban, Does 
Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1420 (1988) 
(“[U]niversities frequently allow professors the discretion to spend a certain portion of each 
week, typically no more than one day, on off-campus activities or on nonuniversity work 
on campus.”).  
53 The percentage of professors in the respective samples with at least one issued U.S. 
patent covering research they conducted in their capacity as a university employee.  For the 
random target population sample, I collected this data by searching for each professor’s 
name in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s online database.  U.S. PAT. AND 
TRADEMARK OFF., USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE, 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (last updated Apr. 22, 2014).  Survey 
respondents answered the following two questions:  
(1) “Has your university research ever been the subject of a patent application listing you 
as an inventor or coinventor? Do not include, for example, patent applications filed by you 
or an outside company based on research you performed as a consultant or on research you 
performed in industry before entering academia”; and  
(2) “How many of those applications have to date issued as patents?”  App. A, infra. 
54 Among professors named as an inventor or co-inventor on at least one issued university-
owned U.S. patent, the average number of university patents issued in each professor’s 
name.  For collection details, see id. 
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Percent who founded a 
startup55 
20.6% 21.9% 
Gender 90.9% male, 9.1% female 89.4% male, 10.6% female 
 
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF UNIVERSITY HIGH-TECH PATENTS 
Survey respondents provided a variety of data on their patent-related 
activities and experiences.  This Part reports their responses, broken down 
into two broad categories.  First, I report survey data on the direct financial 
costs and revenues to universities—i.e., the profitability—of patenting high-
tech university research.  Second, I report survey data on the indirect 
societal costs and benefits of the same activity.  Both sets of data suggest 
that the costs of high-tech university patent ownership may exceed the 
benefits.56 
A. Direct Costs and Revenues to Universities 
Table 3 below presents data on survey respondents’ patent filing and 
licensing activities.  Approximately two-thirds of respondents reported that 
they have been named as an inventor or co-inventor on a U.S. patent 
application resulting from their university research, with a median of four 
applications per respondent.  Of those who had filed an application covering 
their university research, more than four-fifths reported that at least one of 
their applications had resulted in an issued U.S. patent, with the median 
patentee-respondent reporting that his or her research had resulted in three 
issued patents.57  Of respondents whose research had been patented, about 
                                                
55 The percentage of professors who are either expressly identified as a company’s 
“founder” or otherwise held a senior position, such as Chief Technology Officer or Chief 
Scientist, at an early-stage university spin-off. 
56 Other studies of the direct costs and revenues of university tech transfer offices have 
reached the same conclusion.  Valdivia, supra note 39, at 9 (estimating that 130 of 155 
surveyed universities did not break even in 2012); Memorandum from Bob Litan & Lesa 
Mitchell, The Kaufman Found., to Esther Lee, Dep’t Com., 2 (Aug. 17, 2009) (copy on file 
with author) (“[T]he majority of university [technology licensing offices] actually lose 
money – that is, generate less licensing revenue for the university than the cost of their 
operations.”); Stevens, supra note 36, at 31 (finding in a survey of university tech transfer 
offices that only about 50-65% made a profit each year between 1992 and 2004). 
57 Overall, respondents reported a total of 1517 applications resulting in 1024 issued 
patents.  This ratio of applications to issued patents comports with prior estimates of the 
aggregate grant rate nationwide.  See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent 
Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 193 (2008) (finding that, taking continuation 
applications into account, the PTO grants patents to more than 70% of applicants).  
 
 DO UNIVERSITY PATENTS PAY OFF? 
302 
two-thirds reported licensing at least one of their patents, with the median 
licensor-respondent reporting that licenses to his or her patents have, to 
date, earned his or her university a total of $30,000 in royalties.58 
 
 
Table 3: Respondents’ Patent-Related Activities 
 
      Patent Applications 
      Percent of respondents who filed a university 
patent application59 
 
65.7% (176 of 268) 
          No. university patent apps per filer 
               Mean 
               Median 
 
8.7 
4 
      Issued Patents 
      Percent with an issued university patent 
 
54.5% (146 of 268) 
          No. issued university patents per patentee 
               Mean 
               Median 
 
7.0 
3 
  
      Licenses and Royalties 
      Percent with a licensed university patent 
 
35.4% (95 of 268) 
          No. licensed university patents per licensor60  
                                                                                                                       
However, as discussed infra in note 74, I was only able to account for about 85% of 
reported applications using application data collected from publicly available databases, 
which suggests that respondents who provided an approximate number of applications may 
have disproportionately rounded up.  See App. A, infra (inviting respondents “to round to 
the nearest increment of 5 (i.e., 5, 10, 15, 20) if [they] cannot recall the number [of patent 
applications they have filed] with greater precision”). 
58 There is at least one good reason to believe that even this number is an overestimate.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some professors may have included some royalties 
earned from copyright, rather than patent, licenses in their total dollar figure.  Two 
professors noted that, in addition to patent rights, they had separately licensed copyrights to 
software they created as part of their research activities.  One stated that he had excluded 
copyright license fees from the amount he reported, but was unsure whether this was the 
correct choice.  Another stated that he had in fact included copyright license fees in his 
reported figure.  Thus, it is possible that other professors were similarly confused and, as a 
result, inflated their royalty totals.   
59 Specifically, the survey asked: “Has your university research ever been the subject of a 
patent application listing you as an inventor or co-inventor?”  App. A, infra.  Cf. Thursby et 
al., supra note 38, at *8 (finding in a study of all “science and engineering” faculty at six 
major research universities between 1983 and 1997 that roughly 65% had never pursued a 
patent on their research).   
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               Mean 
               Median 
4.1 
2 
          Royalties earned  
               Per licensor61 
                    Mean 
                    Median 
                    Std. Dev. 
               Per licensed patent 
                    Mean62 
                    Median63 
                    Std. Dev. 
 
 
$606,771 
$30,000 
$2,603,403 
 
$140,132 
$9,259 
$622,639 
  
 
As shown below in Figures 1 and 2, aggregate licensing revenue is 
heavily dependent on a small number of licenses that are extreme outliers.  
More than seventy percent of the reported royalty total was generated by 
less than three percent of licensors,64 and the top nine percent of licensors 
were responsible for over eighty-five percent of all reported licensing 
revenue.  By contrast, almost twenty-five percent of all licensor- 
respondents65 reported that their licenses have, at least to date, failed to earn 
any royalties.  Another nine percent of licensors each reported earning 
$5,000 or less for their universities.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
60 Of the 95 respondents who indicated that at least one of their university patents had been 
licensed, only 92 provided data on the number of patents they had licensed. 
61 Of the 95 respondents who indicated that at least one of their university patents had been 
licensed, only 75 provided data on the size of the royalties paid for those licenses. 
62 One respondent provided data on total royalties earned, but did not specify how many of 
his or her patents had been licensed.  This figure is the per patent mean excluding this 
respondent’s partial data.  Replacing that respondent’s missing number of licensed patents 
with the mean (4) would yield a per patent mean royalty of $138,743.  Replacing the 
missing data with the median (2) would yield a mean royalty of $139,594.  Neither would 
change the median per patent royalty. 
63 Because each respondent reported his or her royalty figures in the aggregate, rather than 
per individual patent, I cannot calculate a precise per patent median.  This figure is, instead, 
the median of licensors’ individual per patent means. 
64 Accounting for 2% of patentees, 1.7% of applicants, and 1.1% of respondents. 
65 24 percent of licensors, accounting for 16.4% of patentees, 13.6% of applicants, and 9% 
of respondents. 
 DO UNIVERSITY PATENTS PAY OFF? 
304 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Licensing successes are so rare, in fact, that high-tech patenting may 
be a net loss for these twenty universities.66  To estimate the cost of 
prosecuting respondents’ applications and maintaining respondents’ patents, 
I collected cost-related data from a sample of respondents’ patent 
                                                
66 In the aggregate.  To be sure, some individual universities—i.e., those that were a party 
to one or more of the outlier licenses—may turn a profit.  See Valdivia, supra note 39, at 9 
(estimating that roughly 16% of university tech transfer programs made a profit in 2012). 
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applications and issued patents.  As shown below in Table 4, I found that 
universities prosecuted respondents’ applications through an average of 3.8 
total responses per original application, corresponding to roughly 1.67 final 
dispositions per application with 2.28 responses per disposition. 67  A little 
over seven percent of respondents’ applications included an appeal to the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and over forty percent were 
preceded by a provisional application.68  I also observed that universities 
frequently hired top-dollar legal talent to prosecute respondents’ 
                                                
67 I collected prosecution-related data from the U.S. PTO’s Public Patent Application 
Information Retrieval (PAIR) database for a sample of 165 of respondents’ published, 
original applications.  U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., PAT. APPLICATION RETRIEVAL 
INFO., http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (last visited Apr. 23, 2014).  The average 
number of responses per original application among respondents is very similar to the 
overall average among all U.S. patent applicants, though respondents had slightly fewer 
responses per disposition and slightly more final dispositions per application. Cf. 
University of California, supra note 41, at 20 (showing that between 2009 and 2013 the UC 
system filed 4031 original applications and 3720 continuations, a ratio of almost 1:1).  
Overall, U.S. patent applicants prosecute their applications through an average of about 
3.75 responses, corresponding roughly to an average of 1.5 “final dispositions” of 2.5 
office actions each.  See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An 
Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2125 (2000) (finding 
that between 1996 and 1998 patents were prosecuted, on average, through 1.5 final 
dispositions); Thierry Lo, Presentation to the Amer. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n, USPTO 
Statistics Update (Patents, PPH, & Reexaminations) 17 (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://www.aspa.org.sg/Thierry%20Lo%20Presentation%20on%20USPTO%20Patent%20
Stats.pdf (showing that, according to PTO data, the number of office actions per disposal 
has varied between 2.91 and 2.42 in recent years).  As defined by the PTO, a “final 
disposition” can be any of the following: an “(1) allowance, (2) final rejection, (3) the 
declaration of an interference, or (4) abandonment.”  Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 
Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Did You Know?, FULL DISCLOSURE 10  (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.finnegan.com/files/upload/Newsletters/Full_Disclosure/2011/November/FullDi
sclosure_Nov11_Print.pdf.  Despite their designation as “final,” many applications 
continue to be prosecuted after a “final” rejection as continuation applications, as “RCE” 
applications, and/or through appeals to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. See, e.g., 
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 52 (6th ed. 2013) (providing an overview of prosecution options 
following a “final rejection”).  
68 Respondents are above average on both counts.  Overall, U.S. patent applicants file an 
appeal during the prosecution of about 1.5 to 4.5% of applications, Ron Prevost, U.S. Dep’t 
Com., Off. Inspector Gen., USPTO’s Other Backlog: Past Problems and Risks Ahead for 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 1 (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-12-032-A.pdf (“Around 1–3 percent of the 
applications that examiners decide [presumably including continuation applications] each 
year are appealed by the applicant.”), and file about one provisional for every three original 
applications, Dennis Crouch, NonProvisional and Provisional Patent Applications FY 
2002-2008, PATENTLY-O (June 3, 2008), 
http://patentlyo.com/media/images/2008/06/Patent.Law083.jpg. 
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applications, with more than forty percent handled by law firms ranked 
among the 250 largest in the United States.69  In addition to prosecution 
expenses, universities paid maintenance fees to keep respondents’ issued 
patents alive at above-average rates, electing to make the first maintenance 
fee payment for ninety-four percent of their patents, the second for eighty 
percent of their patents, and the third for sixty-nine percent of their 
patents.70   
On the other hand, roughly nine percent of respondents’ applications 
were co-assigned to their respective universities and another entity, one 
which may have helped to defray the costs of prosecution and maintenance.  
7.4% of respondents’ applications were co-owned at the time of their 
publication by a for-profit corporation, very likely a research partner that 
funded the research leading to the respondent’s invention, and 1.5% were 
co-owned by another non-profit research institution, very likely the 
employer of a respondent’s co-inventor.71  Moreover, respondents’ patents 
                                                
69 As ranked by the National Law Journal. 2013 NLJ 350, NAT’L L.J., 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202603325795 (June 10, 2013).  Roughly 90% of 
these firms—i.e., 36% of all firms prosecuting respondents’ applications–are also among 
the 100 most profitable law firms as ranked by The American Lawyer. 2013 Am Law 100, 
AM. LAW., http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202489912232/The-2013-Am-Law-100 
(Apr. 25, 2013).  Firms prosecuting multiple of respondents’ patent applications include, 
inter alia, Baker Botts, L.L.P.; Fish & Richardson, P.C.; K&L Gates, L.L.P.; McDermott, 
Will & Emery, L.L.P.; and Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. 
70 I collected this data from a sample of 315 issued university-owned patents that list a 
respondent as an inventor or co-inventor and for which at least one maintenance fee 
payment had come due.  On average over the last 20 years, U.S. patent owners have paid 
the first maintenance fee roughly 80 to 90% of the time, the second roughly 60 to 70% of 
the time, and the third roughly 40 to 50% of the time.  Dennis Crouch, Patent Maintenance 
Fees, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 26, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/patent-
maintenance-fees.html. 
71 I collected co-assignment information from Google Patents for a sample of 715 
published, original applications listing a respondent as an inventor or co-inventor.  The rate 
of co-ownership among respondents’ applications appears to be slightly above average for 
university patents as a whole.  See Mark Funk, Patenting Partnerships by US Universities, 
J. BUS. ADMIN. ONLINE (Fall 2012), 
https://www.atu.edu/jbao/Patenting_Partnerships_by_US_Universities.pdf (finding that, 
between 1976 and 2006, 10.8% of university patents were co-owned with another entity 
and also that, of the 2506 partnerships that produced these co-owned patents, 1481 (or 
6.4%) were university-corporate partnerships and 357 (or 1.5%) were partnerships between 
universities and other non-profit research institutions); see also Robert Kneller et al., 
Industry-University Collaborations in Canada, Japan, the UK and USA – With Emphasis 
on Publication Freedom and Managing the Intellectual Property Lock-Up Problem, PLOS 
ONE, Mar. 2014, e90302, at 1, 12, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3954545/#pone.0090302.s045 (estimating 
based on a sample of patents owned by 90 tech companies that “[t]he percentage of US 
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and non-abandoned applications have an average of 7.2 years of post-survey 
protection remaining and, thus, will likely continue to earn royalties in the 
future.72 
 
 
Table 4: Data on Respondents’ Patent Prosecution  
Intensity and Maintenance Fee Payment Rates 
Frequency of Prosecution Events 
    Responses per final disposition 
 
2.28 
    RCEs per final disposition 0.21 
    Child applications per original application 0.67 
    Appeals per original application 0.072 
    Provisional applications per original application 0.43 
Size of Prosecuting Firm 
    One of largest 250 firms in the U.S. 
 
41.4% 
    Other firms with 60 or more attorneys 17.2% 
    16-59 attorneys 24.2% 
    4-15 attorneys 8.2% 
    1-3 attorneys 8.9% 
Application Co-ownership 
   Co-owned with for-profit corp. 
   Co-owned with non-profit univ./institute 
 
7.4% 
1.5% 
                                                                                                                       
university patents that are co-owned by companies is less than five”).  But cf. University of 
California, Technology Transfer Annual Report 21 (2012), available at 
http://ucop.edu/innovation-alliances-
services/_files/ott/genresources/documents/IASRptFY12.pdf (reporting that, in 2012, 
16.6% of inventions disclosed to the UC system TTO “included non-UC inventors”). 
72 I collected this data from a sample of 515 published, original applications listing a 
respondent as an inventor or co-inventor.  Accordingly, on average, respondents’ patents 
reached the half-way point of their 20-year term of protection in 2012.  Assuming (i) a 
constant rate of inflation and (ii) that respondents’ patents brought in licensing revenue in a 
roughly symmetrical distribution centered on the mid-point of their term of protection—
e.g., because, as I assume infra, licensing revenue was constant over these patents’ terms 
or, more likely, because relatively few patents brought in licensing revenue both before 
being issued and in the last few years before expiration—a sum of all reported licensing 
revenue produces a tally that is, in effect, a time-adjusted total in 2012 dollars.  Provided 
this assumption is accurate, I can estimate an overall inflation-adjusted rate of return for 
respondents’ patent activities by directly comparing, without the need for further 
adjustment, total reported licensing revenue with an estimate of respondents’ patent 
prosecution and maintenance costs expressed in 2012 dollars. 
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Years of Term Remaining per Patent 
    Average 
    Median 
 
7.2 
7 
Maintenance Fee Payments 
    First payment made 
    Second payment made 
    Third payment made 
 
94% 
80% 
69% 
Mean number of international patent applications 
per U.S. patent application 
0.4 
 
Despite the possibility of future royalties, even a conservative 
extrapolation of patent costs from the figures reported in Table 4 suggests 
that universities spend more obtaining and maintaining high-tech patents 
than they earn back in overall royalties.  The patent activity reported by 
survey respondents would result in a negative rate of return of over three 
percent, even making the following favorable assumptions:  
 
• that patents and applications reported in this survey will continue 
to bring in royalties at current levels until expiration, despite the 
fact that high-tech inventions depreciate rapidly and despite the 
likely existence of at least some one-time lump-sum royalties,73 
 
                                                
73 My estimate assumes that respondents’ patents will be as lucrative in their remaining 
years as they have been on an annual basis to date.  Under this assumption, respondents’ 
patents will earn future royalties equal to 36.2% of their current tally.  This assumption, 
however, likely overstates the total revenue universities will earn.  It is likely that at least 
some reported licenses were made in exchange for one-time lump sum royalty payments.  
See Jerry G. Thursby et al., Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of University 
Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59, at *10 (2001), 
available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.200.3716&rep=rep1& type=pdf 
(finding in a survey of TTOs that 69% reported having “negotiated a license agreement in 
which the only form of payment was an up-front fee”).  These licenses will not generate 
any additional revenue in the future.  In addition, even patents licensed on an ongoing basis 
are likely to bring in less money over time.  Many licenses with running royalties are 
frontloaded by required up-front payments, id. (finding that 92% of TTOs “often” or 
“almost always” include an upfront payment even in a license with a running royalty), and, 
as a practical matter, the useful lifetime of a high-tech invention is relatively short and, 
thus, is unlikely to be of equal value throughout its term. See Love, supra note 8, at 1342 
(“Product lifecycles in the high-tech industry are notoriously short. Computing power, after 
all, doubles roughly every two years. Thus, high-tech patents are the most likely to be 
grossly out of date—technologically speaking—when asserted nearly two decades after 
their filing dates.” (footnote omitted)). 
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285 (2014)  2013-2014  
309 
• that all reported patent applications I was unable to account for 
using public records (and making a reasonable estimate of the 
number of abandoned applications filed before November 29, 
2000) are erroneous overestimates that should be excluded from 
my estimate of prosecution costs, despite the fact that some are 
likely to be unpublished applications filed post-2000 and others 
are likely to be applications published with errors in their 
inventors’ or assignees’ names,74 
 
• that all reported licensing revenue is attributable solely to 
respondents’ U.S. patent rights, despite the fact that respondents 
filed about one international application for every 2.5 U.S. 
applications reported in this survey,75 
 
• that all reported licensing revenue was earned without filing a 
lawsuit and, thus, without incurring litigation expenses, 
 
• that these twenty universities paid median legal fees (the 
nationwide median charged within each prosecuting law firm’s 
                                                
74 Using Google Patents, I was able to locate published, original patent applications 
invented or co-invented by respondents accounting for about 73% of the total number that 
respondents reported.  Combining the number of published patents filed by respondents 
prior to November 29, 2000 with the fact that roughly 30% of original applications filed 
prior to that date were abandoned without at least one child application issuing as a 
published patent, I can account for another 12% of the total number of original applications 
reported by known respondents.  See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006) (requiring the publication 
of most patent applications filed on or after November 29, 2000 “promptly after the 
expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which a benefit is 
sought under this title”); Lemley & Sampat, supra note 57, at 193 (finding that only about 
30% of original patent applications fail to result in at least one issued patent).  In an 
abundance of caution, I excluded the remaining 15% of reported applications from my cost 
estimate.  At least some of these are likely legitimate applications filed post-2000 that were 
abandoned before publication.  See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (making an 
exception to the publication requirement “[i]f an applicant makes a request upon filing, 
certifying that the invention disclosed in the application has not and will not be the subject 
of an application filed in another country”); Dennis Crouch, Unpublished US Applications, 
PATENTLY-O (Dec. 7, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/12/unpublished-us-
applications.html (finding that roughly 7% of patents in recent years issued from 
applications that were filed solely in the U.S. by applicants who requested secrecy until 
issuance).  Additional legitimate applications were likely erroneously excluded from my 
searches due to idiosyncratic database errors.  For example, there are 7 published patent 
applications in the Google Patents database purportedly assigned to the “Perdue,” rather 
than Purdue, Research Foundation and another 2 assigned to “William Marsh University,” 
rather than “William Marsh Rice University.” 
75 See supra, tbl. 4. 
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respective size cohort) for the prosecution of patent applications 
covering moderately complex technology, despite the fact that 
over thirty-five percent of their applications were prosecuted by 
firms among the 100 most profitable in the U.S.,76  
 
                                                
76 For all but the largest firms, my cost estimate assumes that universities paid legal fees to 
each prosecuting firm equal to the nationwide median charge reported by similarly-sized 
firms in the AIPLA 2013 Report of the Economic Survey for prosecution activities 
involving “relatively complex, electrical computer” applications.  AM. INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, at I-114-18 (2013).  
However, the largest firm size category for which the AIPLA reports fee data is “60 or 
more” attorneys.  Id. (breaking down fee data for firms sized “1-3 Attorneys,” “4-15 
Attorneys,” “16-59 Attorneys,” and “60 or more Attorneys”).  As discussed supra in note 
69, about 40% of firms that prosecuted respondents’ patents have between 200 and 2400 
attorneys each.  Accordingly, because they are such extreme outliers among AIPLA 
respondents, my estimate assumes that universities paid fees to firms ranked among the 250 
largest in the U.S. at the 75th percentile, rather than median, reported by firms in the “60 or 
more” attorneys category.  See Am. Bar Assoc., Lawyer Demographics, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/lawyer_dem
ographics_2013.authcheckdam.pdf  (finding in a 2005 survey of ABA members that only 1 
percent of law firms employ 100 or more attorneys).  This departure is still likely to be a 
gross underestimate of fees paid to these firms.  As discussed supra in note 69, 90% of the 
large firms in my sample are also among the 100 most profitable firms in the U.S., which 
places them roughly among the top one-fifth of one percent of U.S. law firms.  See id. 
(additionally showing that in 2005 there were roughly 475 law firms falling within the 1 
percent of firms that employ more than 100 attorneys); The 2013 Am Law 100, supra note 
69 (showing that all ranked firms employed well over 200 attorneys each).  In addition, the 
fees reported to the AIPLA for firms in the “60 or more” attorneys category included large 
outliers, as evidenced by the fact that for most prosecution events the 75th percentile fee in 
this category is actually smaller than the average fee.  REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
2013, supra, at I-114-18   Finally, as discussed supra in note 72, because the 2013 AIPLA 
survey actually reports fees that firms charged in 2012, I can roughly calculate a rate of 
return for respondents’ patenting activities by directly comparing—without the need for 
further time-value adjustments—total reported licensing revenue with an estimate of total 
patent prosecution and maintenance costs extrapolated from this fee data.  Because median 
prosecution-related attorney’s fees have actually been roughly steady over the last decade 
—and for many tasks have actually decreased modestly among large firms, rather than 
risen annually due to inflation—this time-value assumption likely underestimates the legal 
fees respondents’ universities paid as measured in 2012 dollars.  Compare REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, supra, at I-114-18 (reporting an overall median cost of $10,000 
for filing an original high-tech patent application of moderate complexity) with 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2005, at I-95-100 
(2005) (same).  
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• that these universities paid PTO fees at micro-entity levels, 
despite the fact that this fee discount did not exist prior to March 
19, 2013,77 
 
• that 100 percent of licensees reimbursed universities for 100 
percent of the cost of prosecuting and maintaining licensed 
patents, none of which was reported by respondents as licensing 
revenue,78 despite the fact that a prior survey of tech-transfer 
offices found that about ten percent of TTOs at major research 
universities require reimbursement only “sometimes” or 
“rarely,”79 
 
• that 100 percent of corporate co-owners paid for 100 percent of 
the cost of prosecuting co-owned applications and maintaining 
co-owned patents, none of which was reported by respondents as 
licensing revenue, 
 
• that non-profit co-owners paid for one-half of the cost of 
prosecuting co-owned applications and maintaining co-owned 
                                                
77 My analysis assumes that universities pay patent office fees at the current rate for micro-
entities.  See U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., Fee Schedule, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (showing that “micro entities” 
pay fees at a 75 percent discount); 37 C.F.R. § 1.29(d) (providing that an “institution of 
higher education” qualifies as a “micro entity”).  For the vast majority of applications at 
issue in this study, this is a gross underestimate because micro-entity status did not exist 
prior to March 19, 2013.  U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., AIA Changes: Micro Entity New 
Fees, INVENTORSEYE, Feb. 2013, 
http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/independent/eye/201302/Advice.jsp.  Nonetheless, because 
this analysis is most useful in predicting the current profitability of university high-tech 
patenting, using the current level of fees provides the best metric.  
78 Many universities—including at least five of those selected for this survey—do count 
reimbursed fees as licensing income, which (as a practical matter) they are.  University of 
California, supra note 71, at 21 (“Obtaining a licensee’s commitment to reimburse these 
costs is a high priority objective of license negotiations, and reimbursement, therefore, are 
considered part of total licensing income.”); University of Maryland, Office of Technology 
Commercialization, http://www.otc.umd.edu/about/statistics/revenue (last accessed May 
16, 2014) (counting both “royalty income” and “patent reimbursement income” as 
“revenue”); Rice University, Office of Research Annual Report (2011), available at 
http://research.rice.edu/FY11AnnualReport/ (counting both “royalties” and “patent 
reimbursement” as “revenue”). 
79 Thursby et al., supra note 73, at *24, tbl. 4 (finding in a survey of tech-transfer staff at 62 
major research universities that 67.7% reported “almost always” including a patent cost 
reimbursement clause in their license agreements, 21% reported doing so “often,” 8.1% 
reported doing so “sometimes,” and 3.2% reported doing so “rarely”) 
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patents, none of which was reported by respondents as licensing 
revenue,  
 
• that the tech transfer offices at these twenty universities incur a 
slightly lower than typical rate of overhead expense in addition 
to the cost of PTO and attorneys’ fees,80 and finally 
 
• that total licensing revenue is the best measurement of the direct 
monetary benefit universities receive from their patents, despite 
the fact that universities are required by law to share a 
percentage of royalties with faculty inventors.81 
 
A detailed explanation of this calculation is included infra in 
Appendix B. 
                                                
80 My estimate assumes that the tech transfer offices at these universities incur additional 
overhead costs equal to their expenditures on PTO and attorneys’ fees, an assumption that 
would make them about 10 percent more efficient than the average tech transfer office at a 
U.S. university.  See Irene Abrams et al., supra note 5, at 1 (finding, in a survey of 165 tech 
transfer offices, that office budgets were 45 percent legal fees and 55 percent overhead).  
Among tech transfer offices at surveyed universities, some appear to be slightly more 
efficient, and others less efficient, than average.  For example, the Cornell Center for 
Technology, Enterprise, and Commercialization’s overhead expenses were at least 78% as 
large as its legal expenses (not including cost reimbursements) between 2008 and 2012.  
Cornell University, Center for Technology, Enterprise and Commercialization, 2012 
Annual Report 17 (2012), available at http://www.cctec.cornell.edu/about/2012-
AnnualReport.pdf (showing a five-year total of $27.6 million in “legal” expenses, 
excluding litigation costs and reimbursements, and $21.4 million in “office operations” 
expenses, excluding certain other “extraordinary” expenses).  The Purdue Research 
Foundation’s operating expenses, on the other hand, appear to be well in excess of its 
expenditures on legal fees each year between 2009 and 2013.  Purdue Research 
Foundation, About Purdue Research Foundation, http://prf.org/prf-about (last accessed 
May 16, 2014) (linking to the Foundation’s Annual Reports for 2009 through 2013, each of 
which include line item costs for “patent and royalties,” “salaries and other benefits,” and 
“supplies,” among others). 
81 Universities are legally required to share royalties with faculty inventors.  See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 202(c)(7)(B) (requiring “the contractor to share royalties with the inventor”).  University 
policies generally provide a one-third share (net of prosecution costs) to inventors.  See 
Valdivia, supra note 39, at 9 (“[U]niversities generally split licensing revenue in three 
parts: a third for the faculty-inventors, a third for their department or lab, and a third as 
discretionary funds for the university.”).  As a result, rather than total income, some prior 
studies have used licensing income net of inventors’ share when estimating TTO 
profitability.  See Abrams et al., supra note 5 at 13 (measuring TTO profitability using “net 
income after distributions to inventors and for research”). 
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Table 5: Universities’ Estimated Rate of Return on High-Tech Patents 
Method for handling unreported data82 Est. rate of return 
Overall 
    Median substitution 
 
(3.5%) 
    Mean substitution   8.9%83 
Net of disbursements to inventors84 
    Median substitution 
    Mean substitution 
 
(30.6%) 
(22.3%) 
 
With faculty members at these highly-ranked schools reporting 
losses even under the favorable assumptions outlined above, it seems likely 
that high-tech patenting is unprofitable for all but a few U.S. universities 
and, moreover, is substantially less profitable than university patenting in 
the life sciences, which generates a profit for at least some significant 
fraction of institutions.85  
B. Indirect Costs and Benefits to Society 
However, university patents’ direct fiscal impact on university 
budgets does not tell us whether the practice is a net cost or benefit for 
society.  High-tech patenting on university campuses could be a boon to the 
public, while at the same time a financial drain on higher education.  Patents 
                                                
82 Twenty respondents reported that one or more of their patents had been licensed, but did 
not report licensing revenue.  One respondent reported licensing revenue, but did not report 
the number of patents licensed. 
83 As discussed supra, the mean is highly skewed by a small number of extreme outliers.  
Nonetheless, even when replacing missing data with this highly misleading mean, I 
estimate an overall rate of return earned over the 20-year life of a patent that barely 
outperforms the annual inflation-adjusted rate of return for a stock market index fund.  See, 
e.g., Matt Krantz, Effect of Inflation Not Included in 10% Stock Return Rule, USA TODAY, 
May 7, 2012 (reporting that the average annual inflation-adjusted rate of return for the U.S. 
stock market is roughly 6%). 
84 These rates assume an average disbursement to inventors equal to one-third of royalties 
earned net of PTO and legal fees.  See Valdivia, supra note 39, at 9. 
85 See supra note 56 (collecting cites on the overall profitability of university tech transfer); 
see also Harun Bulut & GianCarlo Moschini, U.S. Universities’ Net Returns from 
Patenting and Licensing: A Quantile Regression Analysis (Ctr. for Agric. & Rural Dev., 
Iowa State Univ., Working Paper 06-WP-432 Sept. 2006), available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/synopsis.aspx?id=1024 (finding that universities 
without medical schools are unlikely to profit from tech transfer). 
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exist to encourage research and facilitate its commercialization,86 and 
universities likely pursue patents, at least in part, with these larger societal 
goals in mind.87  Data collected in this survey, however, also casts doubt on 
the indirect societal value of high-tech university patents.  Among 
respondents, university patenting appears to discourage, rather than 
encourage, academic research and has, at best, a mildly positive impact on 
commercialization.  
1. Do University High-Tech Patents Encourage Academic 
Research? 
 One way university patent ownership might benefit society is by 
motivating professors to conduct more or better research.  In other words, 
even if patents appear to be a net drain on university budgets, universities 
might rationally pursue patents to motivate their faculty to produce 
additional research in furtherance of their mission to bring knowledge to the 
world.  Unfortunately, respondents reported almost uniformly that the 
prospect of obtaining patent rights does not spur their research activities. 
i. Factors motivating research activities 
As shown below in Figures 3 and 4, only about ten percent of 
respondents report that the prospect of obtaining patent rights encourages 
them to produce more or better research.88  To the contrary, more than half 
                                                
86 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 736-
38 (2012) (explaining that “the orthodox utilitarian theory of patent law” is that “[w]e grant 
patents . . . to encourage inventions we wouldn’t otherwise get” and that “[t]he dominant 
alternative theory of patent law focuses not on incentives to invent, but on the development 
and commercialization of an invention once it has been made”). 
87 See Abrams et al., supra note 5, at 17 (finding that only 11.5% of surveyed university 
tech transfer offices ranked “revenue maximization” as their top priority and noting that 
“‘Economic Development’ . . . anecdotally is reported to be a significant driving force at 
publicly owned institutions”); Stevens, supra note 36, at 39 (“Of course, revenue 
generation serves as an incentive. But first and foremost, technology transfer must serve 
our core mission: sharing ideas and innovations in the service of society’s well-being.” 
(quoting Mary Sue Coleman, President, University of Michigan)). 
88 The total number of responses recorded in Figures 3 and 4 is 247.  Prior researchers have 
reached the same conclusions about faculty motivation.  See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID 
K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 241 (2008), available at 
http://www.micheleboldrin.com/research/aim.html (“[W]e are not aware of anybody 
claiming, let alone documenting, that after the Bayh-Dole Act took effect, the quality of 
biomedical research in U.S. universities and federal sponsored laboratories visibly 
increased. It just remained roughly where it was, meaning that patentability made no 
difference as far as general incentives are concerned.”); Hazuka, supra note 3, at 196 
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of respondents strongly disagree that this is true.  Moreover, as shown 
below in Table 6, respondents overwhelmingly ranked the prospect of 
obtaining patent rights outside the top four factors motivating their research 
efforts.89 
 
 
Figure 3 
Agree or Disagree: The ability to patent my university research encourages 
me to do MORE research than I would otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
(“[A]cademic scientists, who have driven the revolutionary advances in biomedical 
science, are not generally motivated by the possibility of obtaining patents. Instead, they 
seek publication and the esteem of their peers. Indeed, much biotechnology upstream, basic 
research would take place in the absence of the patent system.”); Rai, supra note 7, at 89–
90 (observing that norms in the scientific research community “promote a public domain of 
freely available scientific information” and eschew “claiming property rights in invention . 
. . as immoral”). 
89 A total of 248 respondents answered the question shown in Table 6.  It is, of course, 
possible that respondents’ rankings of these factors reflect some degree of self-serving bias.  
See Donelson R. Forsyth, Self-Serving Bias, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 429 (2d ed. 2008) (“Self-serving biases are particularly evident when 
individuals formulate attributions about the causes of personal actions . . . . When 
explaining positive actions and experiences, their attributions emphasize the causal impact 
of internal, dispositional causes, but when identifying the causes of negative events, they 
stress external, situational factors.”). 
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Figure 4 
Agree or Disagree: The ability to patent my university research encourages 
me to do HIGHER QUALITY research than I would otherwise 
 
 
Table 6: Factors Motivating Respondents’ Research 
 
Motivating Factors 
Rank 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Not among top 4 
Enjoyment / curiosity / desire 
to advance knowledge 75.8% 13.3% 7.2% 1.6% 2.0% 
Publication and/or 
presentations 10.9 35.1 31.0 12.5 10.5 
Informal status / recognition 
among my peers 9.7 37.5 29.8 12.9 10.1 
Tenure / promotions / raises 6.4 13.3 14.5 29.8 35.9 
Formal awards / recognition90 4.0 4.8 12.5 21.4 57.3 
Other 7.3 4.0 1.6 3.2 83.9 
Patent rights / licensing 0.0 2.0 4.8 8.0 85.1 
Other IP rights, like trade 
secrecy and/or copyrights 0.4 1.2 3.2 4.0 91.1 
                                                
90 As shown on the survey instrument, this choice read in full: “Formal awards / 
recognition, such as Best Paper/IEEE/ACM awards, NAE membership, IEEE Fellow, 
Turing, Nobel, etc.”  App. A, infra. 
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ii. Awareness of royalty sharing 
Respondents’ disinterest in patent rights is also revealed by a 
widespread lack of knowledge among professors about their universities’ 
royalty sharing policies.  In the overall sample, 13.7% of respondents 
reported that they did not know whether their home institutions have a 
policy of sharing royalties with faculty inventors.91  Another one percent 
incorrectly reported that their universities do not share royalties with 
faculty.92  Even among faculty who reported that their universities do share 
royalties, fifty percent reported that they do not know what percentage of 
royalties faculty inventors are entitled to.93  Altogether, 57.3% of 
respondents do not know at least one of these two facts. 
Though these figures improve among respondents who are more 
familiar with the patent system, the improvement is surprisingly small.  
Among patent-holding respondents, 6.3% reported not knowing whether 
their universities share royalties,94 and 1.1% reported incorrectly that their 
universities do not.95  Among patentee-respondents who reported that their 
universities do share royalties, 42.9% reported that they do not know how 
royalties are divided between faculty inventors and their universities.96   
Among respondents who had licensed at least one patent, 2.1% 
reported not knowing whether their universities share royalties,97 and 1.1% 
reported incorrectly that their universities do not.98  Among licensor-
respondents who reported that their universities do share royalties, 31.5% 
reported that they did not know how royalties are divided between inventors 
and their universities.99  Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly of all, 
among startup founders 7.5% reported not knowing whether their 
universities share royalties,100 and 2.5% reported incorrectly that their 
universities do not.101  Among founder-respondents who reported that their 
                                                
91 34 of 248 overall respondents who answered this question. 
92 2 of 248 overall respondents who answered this question.  As discussed supra in note 81, 
universities are required by law to share royalties with faculty inventors, and most provide 
inventors a one-third share net of PTO and legal fees.  
93 106 of 212 overall respondents who answered this question. 
94 11 of 174 patentee-respondents who answered this question. 
95 2 of 174 patentee-respondents who answered this question. 
96 69 of 161 patentee-respondents who answered this question. 
97 2 of 95 licensor-respondents who answered this question. 
98 1 of 95 licensor-respondents who answered this question. 
99 29 of 92 licensor-respondents who answered this question.   
100 3 of 40 founder-respondents who answered this question. 
101 1 of 40 founder-respondents who answered this question. 
 DO UNIVERSITY PATENTS PAY OFF? 
318 
universities do share royalties, 47.2% reported that they do not know how 
royalties are divided between inventors and their universities.102  
Though these findings may appear to call into question respondents’ 
ability to report accurate licensing data, a sensitivity analysis confirms that 
the royalty figures reported supra in Part II.A are robust despite many 
licensors’ ignorance of their universities’ revenue sharing policies.  As also 
discussed supra, total licensing revenue is largely attributable to a small 
number of licensors, all of whom reported knowing what share of licensing 
revenue they receive.103  After all, they have a strong financial incentive to 
know this information.  The majority of licensors who reported not knowing 
how royalties are shared at their universities also reported that their licenses 
had not generated any royalties to date or, likely in an abundance of caution, 
chose not to answer the revenue question.  These licensors’ ignorance of 
revenue-sharing policies has no impact on the overall revenue statistics 
introduced above.  The remaining licensors who were hazy on revenue 
apportionment reported earning relatively small royalty amounts that even if 
trebled (under the assumption that every one of these respondents 
mistakenly reported his or her own share only) would raise the estimated 
rates of return shown in Table 4 by less than four-fifths of one percent. 
iii. Government funding 
Yet another reason to question whether patent rights motivate 
professors is the prevalence of government funding to support academic 
research.  Intellectual property, after all, exists first and foremost to 
encourage ex ante investment in research that would not otherwise occur 
absent ex post rights to the fruits of that research.104  If research is funded 
ex ante from a third-party non-profit source, there is good reason to believe 
that the research will occur irrespective of patent rights, and thus the 
economic basis for issuing those rights is correspondingly weak.105   
                                                
102 17 of 36 founder-respondents who answered this question. 
103 All of the top 18 highest-grossing licensors (collectively responsible for 94% of all 
reported revenue) indicated that they knew the details of their universities’ royalty sharing 
policies. 
104 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 22, at 736 (“[I]f scientists can develop a new invention in 
the course of their regular work, the law doesn’t need to encourage that work with 
exclusivity . . . . We grant patents, on this theory, to encourage inventions we wouldn’t 
otherwise get.”).  
105 Accordingly, government subsidies for research are often viewed as substitutes for 
patent rights.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-
Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 307 (2013) (listing “the four main policy tools for 
promoting R&D: patents, prizes, government grants, and R&D tax incentives”).  
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Consistent with prior studies of publicly-funded research in the life 
sciences,106 survey respondents report that ex ante funding from the 
government for high-tech research is plentiful on university campuses.  
Sixty-eight percent of professors’ university patent applications covered 
publicly-funded research.107  Eighty-three percent of respondents who had 
filed an application had filed at least one covering the fruits of government 
funded research.108 
In addition to practical concerns about incentives to invent, 
patenting the fruits of publicly-funded research also raised ethical concerns 
for some professors.  In narrative responses, several questioned the 
propriety of a system that, in effect, publicizes the cost of research and 
privatizes the benefits.  As one respondent put it: “My research is funded by 
government agencies.  The public has already paid for it.  They should not 
have to pay again.”  Several others provided similar comments.109  
                                                
106 See MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF 
NEW DRUGS 8 (2005) (“Taxpayer-financed medical research, whether in NIH labs or 
through government grants to academic and nonprofit medical centers, reached $27 billion 
in 2003, almost equal to industry spending . . . . Over the years, NIH funded research 
played not only the key role in virtually all of the basic scientific breakthroughs that 
underpin modern medicine but also a central role in the application of those findings to the 
search for many new therapies.”); Gold & Carbone, supra note 4, at S48 (noting that the 
National Institutes of Health “has funded part of virtually every major U.S. biomedical 
research project at some stage”); Anna Schissel et al., Survey Confirms Fears About 
Licensing of Genetic Tests, 402 NATURE 118, 118 (1999) (finding that 67% of genetic 
patents issued in the United States covered research funded by the U.S. government); 
Ouellette, supra  28, at 323 (reporting that patent rights to over 9% of pharmaceuticals 
approved by the FDA between 1988 and 2005 are owned in whole or in part by universities 
or other public institutions). 
107 1031 of 1517 total applications.  This percentage of patents matches almost perfectly the 
percentage of overall high-tech university research funded by the government.  See RONDA 
BRITT, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND DEVELEMENT EXPENDITURES: 
FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 15-16 (2006), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06323/pdf/nsf06323.pdf (showing that between 1997 and 
2004, the federal government funded 67% of all university R&D expenditures in computer 
science and electrical engineering). 
108 30 of 176 total respondents who have at least one issued patent. 
109 One respondent wrote: “I believe that publicly funded research should belong in the 
public domain and should therefore not be patentable by universities, professors, or 
students.” A second: “The Bayh-Dole Act has been a disaster for American universities . . . 
[because] it encourages publicly financed research to be privately held and exploited for 
profit.”  And, a third: “It’s not clear to me why any institution or individual can own results 
of publicly funded research.” 
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2. Do University High-Tech Patents Hinder Academic 
Research? 
In fact, rather than encouraging academic research, many survey 
respondents reported that university patenting programs actually impede 
their research.  As shown below in Figures 5-7, among respondents who 
expressed a clear opinion one way or the other, the majority indicated that 
university patent rights actually harm their ability to bring in research 
funding from private sources, to collaborate with professors at other 
institutions, and to share their discoveries with the rest of the research 
community.   
Moreover, dissatisfaction with patents’ impact on academic research 
increased, rather than decreased, with respondents’ experience with 
university tech transfer.  Among respondents who had founded a startup, 
presumably those who had “benefited” the most from university patent 
rights, thirty-four percent indicated that patents harmed their ability to 
obtain research funding, thirty-four percent indicated that patents hindered 
their ability to collaborate with other researchers, and twenty-nine percent 
indicated that patents harmed their ability to disseminate their ideas, 
compared to just twenty-two, four, and twelve percent, respectively, who 
indicated that patents helped in each category. 
i. Research Funding from Private Sources 
Among those who provided narrative commentary related to 
research funding, respondents most often noted the potential for university 
patent rights to strain relationships between professors and companies that 
fund academic research.  Several faculty members reported that, 
increasingly, they cannot negotiate research agreements with industry 
partners without involving their tech transfer offices, a requirement that 
adds complexity and delay to the process of acquiring funds.110  Also, as 
                                                
110 See Rice University, supra note 78, at 7 (“Since its inception, OTT has taken on an 
increasingly larger role in the completion of industry-sponsored research agreements. Over 
this time, the negotiation of intellectual property clauses has become increasingly difficult 
and complex.”); Scott Jaschik, Fast Track or End Run?, INSIDE HIGHER ED, May 28, 2013, 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/05/28/ucla-tells-professors-not-apply-major-
new-pharmaceutical-grant (explaining how GlaxoSmithKline’s attempts to directly fund 
faculty research projects, rather than approaching faculty indirectly through the UCLA 
TTO, led “the University of California at Los Angeles [to take] the unusual step of telling 
professors not to apply to a major new grant competition from [the] pharmaceutical 
company”); Steve Lohr, IBM and Universities Plan Collaboration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2006, at C11 (“Universities have made life increasingly difficult to do research with them 
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one professor noted, aggressive patent licensing efforts have the potential to 
backfire: tech companies threatened with patent assertion have been known 
to retaliate with their own “threat[s] . . . not [to] give any more grants if a 
lawsuit is filed.”  Micron recently made one such threat.  When it was sued 
by the University of Illinois, the company responded with a public 
statement that “effective immediately, Micron will no longer recruit UIUC 
students . . . . and . . . [will] suspend participation in other joint activities 
[with the university].”111 
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of University Patenting on  
Ability to Attract Research Funding112 
 
                                                                                                                       
because of all the contractual issues around intellectual property” (quoting Stuart Feldman, 
Vice President for Computer Science, IBM Research)). 
111 See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Although “Without Tact”, Micron’s Retaliatory Decision to 
Stop Hiring University of Illinois Graduates Is Not Illegal, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/although-without-tact-microns-retaliatory-decision-to-
stop-hiring-university-of-illinois-graduates-is-not-illegal.html.  For a discussion of 
university administrators’ take on the possibility that patent assertion will reduce faculty 
members’ research budgets, see Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth, supra note 10, at 197-
99. 
112 On the survey instrument, respondents were presented with a checklist of possible costs 
and benefits from which to select.  The choices pertaining to research funding were, in full: 
“HARMS faculty members’ ability to bring in RESEARCH FUNDING by, e.g., creating 
conflicts between the university and companies/entities that might help fund their research” 
and “HELPS faculty members bring in additional RESEARCH FUNDS by, e.g., attracting 
companies/entities that help fund their research.” App. A, infra. 
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ii. Collaboration 
Respondents likewise expressed concern that university patent 
programs make it more difficult for faculty members to collaborate with 
colleagues at other institutions.  In today’s academic environment, cross-
university collaboration requires coordination between multiple institutions’ 
tech transfer offices.  The resulting transactions costs deter, and sometime 
outright tank, collaboration, which as one respondent explained, is 
particularly troubling for the future of high-tech research because “[t]he best 
innovations . . . and products involve thousands of interlocking ideas in 
EECS” and, accordingly, “no one person can actually claim full credit” for 
creating them. 
 
Figure 6: Effect of University Patenting on  
Ability to Collaborate Across Institutions113 
 
iii. Secrecy 
Respondents were also vocal about the impact that patents have on 
the dissemination of academic research and, consequently, on the research 
environment at universities.  Several wrote that university patents have a 
negative effect on academic culture.  One respondent stated:  “Within the 
                                                
113 The choices pertaining to collaboration were, in full: “HARMS faculty members’ ability 
to COLLABORATE with others by, e.g., creating conflicts between your university and 
the university employing a researcher with whom they wish to collaborate” and “HELPS 
faculty members COLLABORATE with other professors at other universities by, e.g., 
attracting those professors and/or their home institutions.”  App. A, infra. 
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university environment, . . . there [historically have been] lots of cultural 
incentives to share information, record it for posterity, pass it on to students, 
etc . . . . [but] patenting in the university setting adds a lot of cultural 
pollution to the environment.”  Another concurred, adding: “Too much 
focus on intellectual property in general at universities runs counter to their 
primary mission of creating and disseminating knowledge.  It changes the 
culture in dangerous ways and can significantly damage both progress and 
collaboration.”114  In addition to the impact on culture, respondents also 
expressed concern about increased secrecy’s impact on technological 
progress.  As one put it: “The most valuable commercial contributions of 
academic research in [computer science] have occurred through . . . open 
free dissemination of . . . both papers and software . . . .” 
 
Figure 7: Effect of University Patenting on  
Ability to Disseminate Research115 
 
                                                
114 Accord David Schwartz, 5 Things Tech Transfer Offices Wish Their Start-ups Knew, 
TECH TRANSFER ENEWS Blog (June 5, 2013), http://techtransfercentral.com/2013/06/05/5-
things-tech-transfer-offices-wish-their-start-ups-knew/ (“[D]on’t publish your work in any 
way unless you know it’s safe from an IP protection standpoint.”); Rai et al., supra note 9, 
at 1547 (noting complaints from computer science faculty at the University of Texas about 
their ability to share software). 
115 The choices pertaining to the dissemination of research were, in full: “HINDERS the 
dissemination of new research because, e.g., faculty members keep their research secret 
and/or delay publication until after filing a patent application” and “HELPS disseminate 
new research because, e.g., researchers read patents to learn about new research they 
wouldn’t otherwise be exposed to.”  App. A, infra.  
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3. Consulting and Commercialization Opportunities 
Even if university patenting decreases the overall amount of 
research—as many survey respondents suggest—university patents could, 
at least in theory, nonetheless still benefit society by encouraging the 
commercialization of what university research does take place.  This 
potential benefit was the primary impetus behind the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act116 and is one of the justifications for university patent rights most 
often cited today.117  Many respondents indicated that patent rights do, in 
fact, assist faculty members in their commercialization efforts.  However, 
the evidence is mixed.  
One way in which faculty members can disseminate their ideas to 
industry is by working in industry themselves on a part time basis.  As 
shown below in Figure 8, respondents as a whole indicated that the ability 
to patent their research helps them find work as a consultant, with eighteen 
percent stating that patenting clearly hinders their consulting activities and 
twenty-two percent stating that it clearly helps.  Interestingly, though, 
respondents with the most commercialization experience came to the 
opposite conclusion.  Professors who had founded at least one startup stated 
by a two-to-one margin that patents impede their consulting efforts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
116 See  Gene Quinn, Exclusive Interview: Senator Birch Bayh on Bayh-Dole at 30, 
IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 7, 2010, 8:27pm), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/11/07/exclusive-
interview-senator-birch-bayh-on-bayh-dole/id=13198/ (explaining that the Bayh-Dole Act 
was intended to “hook the private enterprise system up with the intellectual enterprise in 
our universities so we have the entrepreneurial skills of the free enterprise system and the 
intellectual capacity of our researchers . . . . to develop research where it wasn’t already 
being developed” (quoting Sen. Birch Bayh)); Lee, supra note 1, at 31 (“Congress enacted 
[Bayh-Dole] on the view that exclusive rights were necessary to motivate additional private 
investment to develop patented inventions into commercial products.”). 
117 See, e.g., Valdivia, supra note 39, at 5 (“Proponents of Bayh-Dole argue that if the 
government retained title to public patents, the private sector would not invest in the 
development and commercialization of those patents.”); Gene Quinn, Intellectual 
Dishonesty About Bayh-Dole Consequences, IPWATCHDOG (May 10, 2013 12:19pm), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/10/intellectual-dishonesty-about-bayh-dole-
consequences/id=40200/ (collecting examples of successful commercialization of 
university research and concluding that these constitute “overwhelming evidence that 
Bayh-Dole has been extraordinarily successful”). 
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Figure 8: Effect of University Patenting on  
Ability to Work as Consultant with Industry118 
 
 
When asked directly about patenting’s impact on commercialization, 
respondents also indicated that patents appear to be a net benefit.  As shown 
below in Figure 9, forty-two percent of respondents reported that patenting 
helps professors commercialize their research, while twelve percent 
reported the opposite.  Among startup founders, the ratio shrinks 
considerably, with forty-two percent reporting a positive impact and 
twenty-four a negative impact.  Nonetheless, even among this group, the net 
effect appears to be positive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
118 The choices pertaining to consulting work were, in full: “HARMS faculty members’ 
ability to work with industry as a CONSULTANT by, e.g., creating conflicts between the 
university and companies/entities that might hire them as a consultant” and “HELPS 
faculty members find CONSULTING opportunities by, e.g., attracting companies/entities 
that might hire them as a consultant.”  App. A, infra. 
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Figure 9: Effect of University Patenting on  
Ability to Commercialize Research119 
 
 
That said, given that commercialization is the chief reason that 
universities give for seeking patents, respondents’ enthusiasm for patents’ 
impact on commercialization is surprisingly modest.  Though a significant 
percentage of professors reported clearly observing this benefit, a majority 
of respondents reported that university patents had the opposite impact, no 
impact, or a mixed bag of benefits and costs.  Even among startup 
founders—professors who have accomplished precisely what many 
universities say they hope to with their tech transfer programs—the 
majority fails to see a clear positive link between patent rights and 
commercialization. 
Moreover, if narrative responses are any indication of the magnitude 
of the harm or assistance professors received from patents, overall harm to 
commercialization efforts may well exceed the overall benefit received, 
despite the results shown in Figure 9.  Numerous respondents wrote that 
patenting their research will, if anything, ensure that their ideas won’t be 
commercialized.  As one respondent put it: “In my field, a patent is a 
guarantee that the work will not be used.”  Another called university high-
tech patents “destructive to actual impact,” and yet another wrote that “[i]n 
                                                
119 The choices pertaining to commercialization were, in full: “HARMS faculty members’ 
ability to COMMERCIALIZE their research by, e.g., creating conflicts between the 
university and companies/entities/individuals (including the faculty members themselves) 
that might commercialize the research” and “HELPS faculty members COMMERCIALIZE 
their research by, e.g., attracting companies/entities that might help commercialize their 
research.”  App. A, infra. 
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my field, if you patent, you kill your impact[, s]o I don’t patent anything . . . 
.”  Many others chimed in with similar sentiments, writing for example that 
“the patent and licensing process at universities for [computer science and 
engineering] related research [is] a hindrance to research and 
commercialization,” that universities wrongly equate “patent acquisition 
with commercialization . . . [because] the latter has substantial benefits, but 
the former very little,” and that university patent programs “get[] in the 
way, slow[] down the founding of a company and acquisition of capital and 
over-value[] the ‘inventions’ [made] at the university” relative to 
refinements made later by those working to bring an actual product to store 
shelves.120 
In fact, some reported that the disconnect between faculty members’ 
and university administrators’ views on how best to bring technology to 
market is so great that it can push professors out of academia altogether.  As 
one respondent reported, “[t]he emphasis on money making through patents 
is driving those with patentable processes outside the university . . . .”  
Another concurred, stating that universities’ tech transfer policies “create[] 
friction between researchers and administrators” that can “caus[e] a faculty 
member to leave the university.” 
By contrast, very few respondents wrote in favor of university 
patents, and those who did write, wrote with little enthusiasm, stating for 
example: “University patents are on the balance better than putting the 
inventions in the public domain, but it is a fine balance . . . .”  In addition, 
several respondents who reported that university patents helped with 
commercialization efforts also reported that other forms of intellectual 
property provided as much, if not more, assistance.   As one respondent 
explained: “licenses to copyrighted material . . . [are] a major mode of tech 
transfer for my work . . . . [My university] holds the copyright to my 
software, as well as the right to patent it, and [the former] is more relevant 
for me.”121  Others reported similar experiences, explaining that they “rely 
                                                
120 Other respondents voiced general criticism for software patents, even outside the 
university setting.  One wrote: “Patents in the computing industry hinder progress, rather 
than promote it, since any meaningful product depends on hundreds of patents. Patent 
portfolios are a weapon to block competitors . . . . Open source and free sharing of ideas are 
the dominant philosophy.”  A second: “I’m personally against patents for software. I think 
it hurts innovation and distribution of ideas.”  A third: “I am strongly against software 
patents—they are not needed in CS.”  And a fourth: “[I]n CS patents harm the field: many 
are trivial and end up polluting the field. Universities should not pursue patenting at all.” 
121 Accord J. Strother Moore et al., Computer Research Association, Best Practices Memo: 
University-Industry Sponsored Research Agreements (July 2003), 
http://archive.cra.org/reports/ip/bestpractices.html (“[P]atent protection is rarely the best 
form of IT IP protection. Copyright is usually better . . . .”). 
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on soft IP such as software [copyright] licensing” more so than on patents 
and that software “not protected by patent” can nonetheless be successfully 
“licensed to a start-up that [faculty members] co-founded.”  Finally, some 
respondents wrote that, while they support university patenting in some 
research areas that occasionally overlap with ECE and CS research, they 
feel that it is counterproductive for their own research, stating for example 
that “[p]atents in some fields make sense—chemistry, physics—but not 
computer science” and that “outside of medicine universities do not need to 
play that game.” 
4. Net Effect 
The responses described above suggest that the societal impact of 
university patenting in high-tech fields is mixed.  Though it is likely 
impossible to definitively assess these costs and benefits, the data arguably 
leaves more reason for concern than optimism. 
On the whole, data provided by survey respondents suggests that 
universities may be losing money on programs that do not motivate 
professors to conduct more research and, to the contrary, make it at least 
marginally more difficult for professors to carry out research projects that 
require industry funding, academic collaboration, or the expeditious 
dissemination of results.  Moreover, though professors do tend to view 
patent rights as a marginal benefit to commercialization efforts, there is 
good reason to believe that a great deal of commercialization would occur 
absent patent rights122 and that a significant amount of the remainder is 
offset by the fact that some research, which might have been 
commercialized absent university patent programs, never takes place at all 
due to transactions costs created by those programs. 
                                                
122 See MOWERY, ET. AL, supra note 27, at 159, 176 (presenting Axel cotransformation and 
Gallium Nitride as two examples of patented university inventions for which “development 
and commercialization would have gone forward without a patent” and thus licensing 
efforts served only to “levy a tax on the commercialization of an invention that was 
published in the scientific literature”); Rai et al., supra note 9, at 1552-54, 1557 (describing  
several “case studies in which university software patents appear to have been used in a 
manner that hindered, rather than promoted, commercialization” and also noting that “a 
number of unpatented [software] programs [developed at Stanford] have been widely 
adopted by the industry: both MINOS, a linear and nonlinear optimization program, and 
Genscan, a gene structure prediction program, have been used (via a copyright license) by 
dozens of different commercial firms”). 
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III. WHY DO UNIVERSITIES AND FACULTY MEMBERS PATENT?  
If the conclusions drawn from survey data above are accurate—i.e., 
if universities and faculty members alike generally lose more than they gain 
from filing patents on high-tech research—they raise an interesting 
question: why are universities patenting so much research in the first place?  
This Part discusses survey data that may shed some light on this question. 
A.  Why Do Universities Patent Research? 
According to many respondents, one reason universities continue to 
patent despite underwhelming results is a “lottery effect” created by rare, 
but highly-publicized, patent licensing successes.  In other words, university 
administrators may be irrationally basing patent policy on extreme 
outliers—like Eolas’s success against Microsoft, Mirror Worlds’ near miss 
with Apple, and Carnegie Mellon’s at least temporary victory against 
Marvell—that happen far less often than administrators believe. 
As two professors explained in narrative responses: 
I think most of the patent efforts at my university are 
motivated by the bizarre fantasies of out-of-touch 
administrators. These people seem exceptionally unqualified 
to pick between winning and losing ideas. I suspect that my 
university spends far more on patent activities than it makes 
off of its patents. 
 
My institution appears to be overly optimistic in its long-
term estimate of the financial benefits attainable from 
patents. Taken over a decade or more, the patent licensing 
operation consumes more dollars than it produces . . . Still, 
the hope for a ‘big score’ seems to motivate administrators to 
continue the current policy. . . . 
According to these professors, university administrators who lack 
the expertise to properly value and manage technology encourage their 
institutions to file as many patent applications as possible in hopes of 
creating a sustainable revenue stream and, buoyed by occasional successes 
that lead to short term profit and acclaim, continue to spend on applications 
looking for the next big payoff even though their programs remain in the 
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red long term.123  Professors reported being hounded by administrative 
“patent police” who “ask you to patent as much as you can” even though 
they are “generally ignorant of what should and should not be patented.”124  
As a result, “[m]uch time is wasted with people/companies arguing over IP 
rights for things that with high probability will not be worth much.”125 
B.  Why Do Faculty Members Patent Research? 
In addition to poor forecasting by administrators, respondents also 
reported other factors impacting faculty members that fuel patent 
applications on campus.   
For one, consistent with the theory described above, a large 
percentage of respondents reported that their universities at least informally 
take professors’ patent activities into consideration when deciding whether 
to advance professors’ careers.  As shown below in Table 7, fifty-one 
percent of respondents believe that patenting activities are taken into 
account in tenure decisions, as well as in decisions to promote faculty 
members to the rank of full professor or to an endowed chair.126  Another 
                                                
123 See Valdivia, supra note 39, at 11-12 (“Stories of blockbuster patents have fueled the 
ambition of TTO heads and university administrators alike and have also played a role in 
their anxiety for landing a ‘blockbuster’ patent . . . . TTOs may justify any given year to 
stay in business on the expected benefit of next year’s having a blockbuster patent to 
license . . . .”); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing, 23 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 620, 630 (2007) (“One explanation for universities continuing to 
operate TTOs that are money-losing operations is the fact that a university can ‘hit the 
jackpot’ with a single invention.”); Brian J. Love, Subsidizing ‘Patent Roulette’, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, March 5, 2012, at A13 (“[E]nticed by rare instances of licensing 
success, universities across the nation have established offices dedicated to patenting and 
exploiting faculty research.  Each year university officials with wildly optimistic hopes of 
striking it rich pump more and more funding into faltering licensing programs, while at the 
same time hiking tuition, saddling graduates with debt, and thinning employee ranks.”).  
124 Several respondents expressed general concern about the competence of tech transfer 
office staff.  One explained: “Universities typically cannot afford to hire the best people to 
write patent applications effectively, or even to decide whether or not to file a patent.”  A 
second: “University patents are ineffective, since they are badly managed by the IP office 
bureaucrats.” And, a third: “One issue that is aggravating in my field (software) is lack of 
university expertise in patenting.  I had to educate the licensing office repeatedly on this 
point.” 
125 The distribution of royalties reported above correlates well with this theory.  As noted 
above, 85% of all licensing revenue reported in the study derived from just 9% of licensors, 
who collectively licensed just 4% of all reported patents and filed just 3% of all reported 
applications. 
126 See also Paul R. Sandberg et al., Changing the Academic Culture: Valuing Patents and 
Commercialization Toward Tenure and Career Advancement, Proceedings of the Nat’l 
Acad. Sci. Early Edition, Apr. 28, 2014, at 5, available at 
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thirty-eight percent report that they believe patent activities are taken into 
account by university administrators when determining professors’ annual 
raises.  In narrative responses, several respondents additionally reported that 
university administrators award professors who patent often with the best 
lab space and extended periods of paid leave.127   
As a result, relatively junior professors have a strong incentive to 
file patent applications, regardless of their personal views on whether doing 
so would otherwise be in their own or society’s best interest.  In fact, a 
number of professors reported in narrative responses that they had pursued 
patents exclusively in the early years of their careers.  As one respondent 
explained, “I did some patents [early in my career], but decided it was 
interfering with my research and collaborations. So [since then] I have put 
everything from my group in the public domain. Makes for much easier 
collaborations, and helps the PhD students focus on intellectually 
interesting ideas.”  Another concurred, reporting that though he had 
patented in the past, “[t]hese days, I never bother with filing patents. 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2014/04/25/1404094111.full.pdf+html (studying tenure 
policies at 39 universities and concluding that “[i]nclusion of patents and 
commercialization into tenure and promotion has begun at some universities” with 
“language varied from strongly endorsing innovation activities to weakly stating that 
patents can be listed”). 
127 The survey included the following open-ended question: “Does your university 
(formally or informally) take faculty members’ patenting activities into account when 
allocating other generally applicable benefits/resources (e.g., when considering requests for 
a reduced teaching load/sabbatical, office/lab space, etc.)?  If so, please list them below:” 
App. A, infra.  Responses included the two below:   
Faculty leave policies are completely suspended in cases where the 
university suspects that the work may lead to patentable commercial 
products.  I have colleagues who are on leave for five years at a time, 
despite university policies limiting to one year.  The university seems to 
see itself as an amateur venture capitalist who funds work that they think 
might ‘win big’ in the future.  The system is very much open to abuse, 
and has a highly questionable record of success. 
 
[My university] is pretty generous in fostering startup creation by faculty 
and students, and has a good policy of exclusive licensing to transfer 
technology to startups, and allows faculty to take leave of absence to 
pursue the creation of their company. Business and job creation is seen as 
one of the key missions of the school which also has a specific institute 
. . . to coach, help and advise faculty and students in creating their own 
business. Overall, interacting with them has been a positive experience 
thus far. 
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There’s nothing in it for me, my students, or anybody else. They’re just a 
waste of time.”128   
 
Table 7: Administrative Incentives to Patent 
 
Does your university take faculty 
members’ patenting activities into 
account when deciding whether... 
No, not that I 
am aware of. 
Yes - I would say 
that, at least 
informally, 
patents/applications 
are considered. 
Yes - I think 
there is a 
formal, written 
policy. 
To award tenure? 48% (85) 44% (79) 7% (13) 
To give a promotion? 47% (84) 45% (80) 6% (11) 
To give annual raises? 59% (105) 35% (62) 3% (6) 
 
Finally, as shown below in Figure 10, more than a third of 
respondents reported that patents enhance their universities’ and their own 
reputations.129  Accordingly, it seems likely that for many professors and 
administrators, patents have value—independent of licensing and 
commercialization potential—as a symbolic metric of research quality and 
quantity, much like article and citation counts.130  Consistent with this 
theory, many respondents indicated that university patent activities serve as 
a subtle form of marketing that helps universities attract students and 
faculty.131  It is also likely that patents and licenses—even when achieved at 
                                                
128 One respondent explained that he filed patent applications for defensive purposes: “The 
main reason I have pursued a patent filing was defensive—to keep some patent troll from 
stopping my research by claiming patent protection for similar ideas.” 
129 The choices pertaining to reputation were, in full: “ENHANCES the university’s / 
faculty members’ reputations by, e.g., linking their names to popular discoveries/inventions 
(i.e., creating a stronger link to the discovery than would have been possible without a 
patent)” and “HARMS the university’s / faculty members’ reputations by, e.g., linking their 
names to unpopular patents and/or unpopular lawsuits/disputes involving university 
patents.”  App. A, infra. 
130 See, e.g., Sandberg et al., supra note 126, at 2 (“Successful technology transfer brings 
recognition to universities and helps communicate, in a tangible way, the impact of 
university research, which might otherwise seem esoteric.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2010) 
(recommending the creation of new metrics for university tech transfer beyond traditional 
measures like the number of issued and licensed patents); see also Clarisa Long, Patent 
Signals, 69 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627-28 (2002) (theorizing that even “worthless” 
patents can be a valuable means for “credibly publicizing information,” such as the 
quantity of a firm’s “knowledge capital”). 
131 16.5% of respondents indicated, in response to a survey question, that patent programs 
help attract and retain faculty.  App. A, infra (“Which, if any, of the potential BENEFITS 
of university patent ownership listed below have you witnessed? . . . HELPS attract and/or 
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a net (direct) loss—assist university administrators, who can cite them to 
donors and state legislators when seeking additional funding.132  
 
Figure 10: Effect of University Patenting on Reputation 
 
CONCLUSION 
Marketing benefits of patenting aside, data collected in this survey 
paints a less-than-rosy picture of university patent activity in high-tech 
fields.  Surprisingly, given present levels of patent filings and enforcement, 
patenting high-tech academic research appears to be a net detriment to 
university budgets and to the overall advance of innovation, even among the 
                                                                                                                       
retain better FACULTY”).  But see supra page 29 (quoting respondents who explained that 
conflicts over patents can drive away faculty).  11% indicated, in response to the same 
question, that they “help[] attract better students.”  App. A, infra (“Which, if any, of the 
potential BENEFITS of university patent ownership listed below have you witnessed? . . . 
HELPS attract better STUDENTS).  The survey did not include an opposing answer choice 
regarding whether patent policies drove away faculty or students. 
132 See, e.g., Caitlin Schneider & Kyle Swanson, President Coleman Lobbies State 
Legislators for More Higher Education Funding, MICH. DAILY, Mar. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.michigandaily.com/content/2009-03-04/u-president-lobbies-state-funds 
(“[University of Michigan President] Coleman said the University encourages 
entrepreneurship in students and faculty, and that these ventures strengthen the school and 
the state. ‘We want to encourage and reward professors who move inventions and 
innovations into the market place,’ Coleman said. She cited the NanoBio Corporation . . . 
founded by James Baker, a professor of internal medicine and biomedical engineering . . . 
[which] has secured a total of $80 million in venture capital.”); Thursby & Thursby, 
University Licensing, supra note 123, at 631 (noting a “substantial university emphasis on 
licensing, particularly among public universities where the public expects that their 
universities encourage growth”). 
 DO UNIVERSITY PATENTS PAY OFF? 
334 
nation’s most prestigious programs and even making quite favorable 
assumptions about the costs universities incur when patenting and licensing.  
According to this survey’s respondents, high-tech patenting neither fills 
university coffers, nor motivates faculty members to produce more or better 
research.  To the contrary, they report that high-tech patenting on college 
campuses may well reduce the pace and quality of academic R&D.  Thus, 
there is good reason to view present trends in university patent activity—
away from pharmaceuticals and toward consumer electronics—as troubling 
news and, consequently, to encourage universities to think long and hard 
before further accelerating high-tech patent applications and lawsuit filings. 
Even if universities themselves disagree with this assessment, the 
results of this survey show that there is room for improvement.  On the 
whole, professors know surprisingly little about the potential financial 
rewards of patenting their research, but experience rather frequently 
inefficiencies associated with obtaining those rights.  If universities want 
their faculty to patent more often, professors’ responses suggest that 
universities should advertise their royalty sharing programs and, as much as 
possible, streamline negotiations with industry partners and collaborating 
researchers.  In addition, to control costs and thereby increase the potential 
that investments in intellectual property will turn a profit, this survey 
suggests that universities should consider patenting less often—particularly 
when copyright protection alone is likely to be an effective means of tech 
transfer—should allow issued patents to expire with greater frequency, and 
should shop around for more cost-conscious legal representation. 
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APPENDIX A: FULL TEXT OF SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Background Information 
 
Your Academic Affiliation (What university employs you? List more than one if 
applicable.) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
Your Department and/or Research Area (This survey is targeted at faculty in (or 
affiliated with) CS and/or ECE departments. If you are affiliated with one or both, 
but call another department home, please select “Other” and list your home 
department. If you are not affiliated with either, please exit the survey now and 
accept my sincere apologies for the mix up.) 
 Electrical and/or Computer Engineering 
 Computer Science 
 Both 
 Other: _______________________________ 
 
How many years’ experience do you have as a tenured and/or tenure-track faculty 
member?  (For this question and the two that follow, feel free to round to the 
nearest 5-year increment (i.e., 5, 10, 15, 20) if you cannot recall the number with 
greater precision.) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
How many additional years, if any, have you worked in a university research 
setting? (Include, if applicable, years spent in a Masters, PhD, or post-doc program 
working on potentially patentable research) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
How many years’ experience, if any, do you have working in industry? (Include all 
years working in a non-academic setting on potentially patentable research) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
Your Experience with University Patenting 
 
Has your university research ever been the subject of a patent application listing 
you as an inventor or co-inventor? (Do not include, for example, patent 
applications filed by you or an outside company based on research you performed 
as a consultant or on research you performed in industry before entering 
academia.) 
 Yes 
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 No 
 
How many U.S. patent applications (resulting from your university research) have 
been filed listing you as an inventor or co-inventor?  (For this question and the two 
that follow, feel free to round to the nearest increment of 5 (i.e., 5, 10, 15, 20) if 
you cannot recall the number with greater precision. If you have international 
patent applications as well, please list that number separately.) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
How many of those applications resulted from research that was directly funded in 
whole or in part by the federal government or a state government?  (If you work at 
a public university, do not include indirect subsidies like your everyday salary, 
office space, or office supplies.) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
How many of those applications have to date issued as patents?  
 
___________________________________________ 
 
Your Motivation to File for Patents 
 
Does your university take faculty members’ patenting activities into account when 
deciding whether to award TENURE? (Check all that apply) 
 Yes - I think there is a FORMAL, written policy. 
 Yes - I would say that, at least INFORMALLY, patents/applications are 
considered. 
 No, not that I am aware of. 
 Other: _______________________________ 
 
Does your university take faculty members’ patenting activities into account when 
deciding whether to give a PROMOTION (e.g., to a full or endowed 
professorship)? (Check all that apply) 
 Yes - I think there is a FORMAL, written policy. 
 Yes - I would say that, at least INFORMALLY, patents/applications are 
considered. 
 No, not that I am aware of. 
 Other: _______________________________ 
 
Does your university take faculty members’ patenting activities into account when 
deciding whether to give annual RAISES? (Check all that apply) 
 Yes - I think there is a FORMAL, written policy. 
 Yes - I would say that, at least INFORMALLY, patents/applications are 
considered. 
 No, not that I am aware of. 
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 Other: _______________________________ 
 
Does your university (formally or informally) take faculty members’ patenting 
activities into account when allocating other generally applicable 
benefits/resources (e.g., when considering requests for a reduced teaching 
load/sabbatical, office/lab space, etc.)? If so, please list them below: (Do NOT 
consider any mechanism by which the university shares patent licensing revenue 
with faculty. We'll come back to that later.) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
Your Experiences with University Patent Licensing 
 
Have any of your university patents brought in licensing revenue for your 
university? 
 Yes 
 No 
 One or more of my university patents was licensed, but those license(s) 
never generated any revenue for the university. 
 One or more of my university patents has been licensed, but those 
license(s) have not YET generated any revenue for the university. 
 
If so, how many of your university patents have been licensed? 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
Also, if so, about how much total licensing revenue have your university patents 
earned? (A gross approximation is sufficient.) 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
According to your university’s policies, are you entitled to a share of the revenue 
your patents earn the university?  
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
 
If yes, do you know (without looking it up) what percent of the revenue you are 
entitled to receive? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If yes, what percent or other arrangement?     
 
____________________________________________
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Your Motivation to Invent / Research 
 
Please indicate below whether (and to what extent) you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by ranking them on a scale of 1-5 where: 
1 - Strongly Disagree 
2 - Disagree 
3 - Neutral 
4 - Agree 
5 - Strongly Agree 
 
The ability to patent my university research encourages me to do MORE research 
than I would otherwise  
1  2  3  4 5 
Strongly disagree       Strongly agree 
 
The ability to patent my university research encourages me to do HIGHER 
QUALITY research than I would otherwise  
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly disagree       Strongly agree 
 
What ONE factor would you say is MOST important in motivating you to conduct 
research? 
 Obtaining patents and pursuing licensing revenue 
 The ability to publish and/or present your findings at conferences 
 Achieving informal recognition (e.g., as a prominent researcher) among 
your peers 
 Earning tenure, promotions, raises, etc 
 Enjoyment, curiosity, a general desire to advance science or technical 
knowhow, etc. 
 Earning formal awards or recognition, like conference “best paper” 
awards, IEEE or ACM medals/awards, entry into the National Academy of 
Engineering, becoming an IEEE Fellow, or winning the Nobel or Turing 
Prize, etc. 
 Obtaining intellectual property rights other than patents, like trade secrets 
and/or copyrights, and pursuing licensing 
 Other: _______________________________ 
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Please rank the following factors to indicate how much they motivate you to 
research: (Each row must contain an answer choice, so please rank your top 4 and 
then select Column 5 for all factors outside the top 4) 
 
 Most 
important 
Factor 
Second 
Most 
Important 
Factor 
Third 
Most 
Important 
Factor 
Fourth 
Most 
Important 
Factor 
NOT 
among 
the top 4 
factors 
Patent rights / licensing      
Publication and/or 
presentations 
     
Informal status / 
recognition among my 
peers 
     
Tenure / promotions / 
raises 
     
Enjoyment / curiosity / 
desire to advance 
knowledge 
     
Formal awards / 
recognition, such as Best 
Paper/IEEE/ACM awards, 
NAE membership, IEEE 
Fellow, Turing, Nobel, etc. 
     
Other IP rights, like trade 
secrecy and/or copyrights 
     
 
 
Other Effects of University Patenting 
 
Which, if any, of the potential COSTS of university patent ownership listed below 
have you witnessed? (Check all that apply) 
 HARMS faculty members’ ability to bring in RESEARCH FUNDING by, 
e.g., creating conflicts between the university and companies/entities that 
might help fund their research 
 HARMS faculty members’ ability to COLLABORATE with others by, 
e.g., creating conflicts between your university and the university 
employing a researcher with whom they wish to collaborate  
 HARMS faculty members’ ability to work with industry as a 
CONSULTANT by, e.g., creating conflicts between the university and 
companies/entities that might hire them as a consultant 
 HARMS faculty members’ ability to COMMERCIALIZE their research 
by, e.g., creating conflicts between the university and companies/entities/ 
individuals (including the faculty members themselves) that might 
commercialize the research 
 Results in significant LOSS of faculty members’ PRODUCTIVITY due to 
time spent working with patent lawyers (or other university officials)—i.e., 
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loss of substantial chunks of time that faculty members would otherwise 
devote to additional research  
 HARMS the university’s / faculty members’ reputations by, e.g., linking 
their names to unpopular patents and/or unpopular lawsuits/disputes 
involving university patents 
 HINDERS the dissemination of new research because, e.g., faculty 
members keep their research secret and/or delay publication until after 
filing a patent application 
 I have witnessed no such costs and/or such costs do not exist. 
 Other: _______________________________ 
 
Which, if any, of the potential BENEFITS of university patent ownership listed 
below have you witnessed? (Check all that apply) 
 HELPS attract better STUDENTS 
 HELPS attract and/or retain better FACULTY 
 HELPS faculty members bring in additional RESEARCH FUNDS by, e.g., 
attracting companies/entities that help fund their research 
 HELPS faculty members COLLABORATE with other professors at other 
universities by, e.g., attracting those professors and/or their home 
institutions 
 HELPS faculty members find CONSULTING opportunities by, e.g., 
attracting companies/entities that might hire them as a consultant 
 HELPS faculty members COMMERCIALIZE their research by, e.g., 
attracting companies/entities that might help commercialize their research 
 ENHANCES the university’s / faculty members’ reputations by, e.g., 
linking their names to popular discoveries/inventions (i.e., creating a 
stronger link to the discovery than would have been possible without a 
patent) 
 HELPS disseminate new research because, e.g., researchers read patents to 
learn about new research they wouldn’t otherwise be exposed to 
 I have witnessed no such benefits and/or such benefits do not exist. 
Other: _______________________________ 
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APPENDIX B: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF COST MODEL 
Costs Revenue 
  
Prosecution costs 
U.S. PTO micro-entity fees: 
Per original application133 (no. of applications134) 
($400) (1,264) 
Per provisional app. (rate per orig. app.) 
($65) (0.43) 
Per continuation/RCE app.135 (rate per orig. app.) 
($400) (0.87) 
Per appeal136 (rate per orig. app.) 
($200) (0.072) 
Per issuance (rate per orig. app.137) 
($240) (0.82) 
 
Attorney’s fees 
Est. overall average per original app.138 
Reported licensing revenue  
Total earned to date:140 
$46,007,786 
Total projected future earnings:141 
$16,654,819 
 
Cost reimbursement by licensees 
PTO/legal cost reimbursement for all licensed 
patents142  
$11,661,781 
 
Disbursements to inventors143 
($20,887,535) 
 
 
                                                
133 This figure is the total of three fees due when filing a basic original utility patent 
application: the filing fee ($70), search fee ($150), and examination fee ($180).  See U.S.  
Pat. & Trademark Off., Manual of Patent Examination Procedures § 607 (“The basic filing, 
search and examination fees are due on filing of the nonprovisional application . . . .”); U.S. 
Pat. & Trademark Off., Fee Schedule, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (showing fees for “micro 
entities”).  My cost estimate does not include any late fees, excess claim fees, or 
application size fees.  See id. 
134 This tally, which represents the number of published original applications I was able to 
verify using public databases (plus an allocation for abandoned applications filed before 
November 29, 2000), is only 83% of the 1517 applications reported by respondents, and 
thus is likely an underestimate.  See supra note 74. 
135See, e.g., George Wheeler, Continuation and RCE Practice, at *4 (2008),  
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/papers/bootcamps/08patentbootcamp/Documen
ts/Wheeler-paper.pdf (“The fees [due upon filing a continuation application or RCE] are 
the same as the basic filing, search, and examination fees for a new non-provisional patent 
application.”). 
136 My cost estimate assumes that all appeals were terminated without need for oral 
argument. 
137 My cost estimate assumes that, in addition to the number of issued patents reported by 
respondents, 70 percent of respondents’ non-issued original applications filed in 2010 or 
more recently will eventually result in an issued patent. 
138 As described supra in note 76, I calculated this average legal fee estimate, and all that 
follow, using the AIPLA’s 2013 Report of the Economic Survey in conjunction with the 
percentage of firms of various sizes prosecuting respondents’ patents using the following 
formula: (median fee among firms sized 1-3 attorneys)*(percentage of firms prosecuting 
respondents’ applications sized 1-3 attorneys) + (median fee among firms sized 4-15 
attorneys)*(percentage of firms prosecuting respondents’ applications sized 4-15 attorneys) 
+ (median fee among firms sized 16-59 attorneys)*(percentage of firms prosecuting 
respondents’ applications sized 16-59 attorneys) + (median fee among firms sized 60 or 
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($12, 197) 
Est. overall av. per prov. app. (rate per orig. app.) 
($5,656) (0.43) 
Est. overall av. per response (rate per orig. app.) 
($3,662) (3.8) 
Est. overall av. per appeal (rate per orig. app.) 
($5,283) (0.072) 
Est. overall av. per issuance (rate per orig. app.) 
($750) (0.82) 
 
Maintenance fee costs 
U.S. PTO micro-entity fees 
1st payment amt. (rate paid per issued patent) 
($400) (0.94) 
2d payment amt. (rate paid per issued patent) 
($900) (0.80) 
3d payment amt. (rate paid per issued patent) 
($1,850) (0.69) 
Est. overall average attorney’s fee per payment 
($380) 
 
Costs paid up front by co-owners 
PTO/legal costs paid by corporate co-owners (rate 
per orig. app.) 
$33,175 (0.074) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
more attorneys)*(percentage of firms prosecuting respondents’ applications sized 60-199 
attorneys) + (third quartile fee among firms sized 60 or more attorneys)*(percentage of 
firms prosecuting respondents’ applications sized 200 or more attorneys). 
139 See supra note 80.  The University of California system reported a very similar, and 
slightly higher, level of per application overhead expense in 2005 and 2006, the last year 
for which the UC system provided detailed data on its operating expenses.  University of 
California, UC Technology Transfer Annual Report 6, 12, 17 (2006), available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/genresources/documents/OTTRptFY06.pdf (reporting $31.7 
million in “operating expense”—an amount that, itself, “[d]oes not include operating 
expenses associated with technology transfer program administration at the individual 
campuses”—in 2005 and 2006, a time period when the system filed approximately 1017 
original, non-provisional U.S. patent applications and oversaw approximately 1100 to 1200 
active patent licenses).  Cornell also reported a similar, and again slightly higher, level of 
overhead expense per application.  See Cornell University, supra note 80, at 16-17 
(reporting that between 2008 and 2012, the university incurred over $21.3 million in 
“office operations” expenses—an amount that, itself, does not include undefined 
“extraordinary” expenses—and filed 591 original, non-provisional applications). 
140 Including median substitution for missing royalty data.  See supra note 82.  As 
discussed supra in note 58, this figure is likely an overestimate, inter alia, because it likely 
includes at least some amounts paid for copyright, rather than patent, licenses.   
141 Assuming constant revenue for an additional 7.2 years.  See supra note 72. 
142 Assuming that respondents’ to-be-issued patents, see supra note 137, will be licensed at 
the same rate as respondents’ already-issued patents.  This figure is likely an overestimate 
because, inter alia, it very likely double-counts funds that respondents reported as licensing 
revenue.  See supra in note 78.  
143 Factored in as one-third of revenue earned net of PTO/legal costs. 
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PTO/legal costs paid by non-profit co-owners (rate 
per orig. app.) 
$16,588 (0.015) 
 
Est. TTO overhead expenses per orig. app.139                      
$30,471 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Est. overall cost total (PTO, legal, and 
overhead) per orig. app. filed by respondents: 
($60,943) 
 
Est. overall revenue total per orig. app. filed 
by respondents: 
$58,801 
Est. overall revenue total net of 
disbursements to inventors per orig. app. filed 
by respondents: 
$42,276 
  
  
              Estimated Total Rate of Return:                  [$58,801 - $60,943] / $60,943 = (3.5%) 
                    Net of Disbursements to Inventors:       [$42,276- $60,943] / $60,943 = (30.6%) 
 
 
 
